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CHAPTER 15 
Land Use Planning Law 
"" JULIAN J. D' AGOSTINE and RICHARD G. HUBER 
A. ZONING 
§15.1. Educational uses. In an appeal from a petition in the Land 
Courtl for a ruling on the validity of a Cambridge zoning by-law as it 
applied to the petitioner, the Supreme Judicial Court in Radcliffe 
College v. City of Cambridge2 had an opportunity to review and dis-
cuss the exemption from zoning by-laws afforded to public educational 
institutions. General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 2, provides" ... that 
no ordinance or by-law which prohibits the use of land for any church 
or other religious purpose or for any educational purpose which is 
religious, sectarian, denominational or public shall be valid." There 
was no dispute that Radcliffe College is a public educational institu-
tion and that its new library will be used for educational purposes. At 
issue was whether the ordinance, which requires for off-street parking 
one car space for each 1000 feet of gross floor area, is valid as applied 
to the college. Stated more generally, the question was whether the 
broad language of General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 2, barred the 
imposition in a zoning ordinance of the parking requirement, how-
ever appropriate and desirable it might be. The Court found the 
ordinance valid, holding that it did not prohibit the use of the land 
for educational purposes because the provision of parking spaces, 
similar to the provision of room and board for students, instructors 
and maintenance personnel, was a secondary function incidental to 
the main educational purpose. The Court, recognizing the limited 
space available to the college in Cambridge, suggested that as other 
college land is developed in this particular area and the space available 
for parking is used for building, the City of Cambridge may amend its 
zoning ordinance to authorize the college to use its land for its primary 
educational function. Even if no change in the ordinance is adopted in 
the future the situation may develop over a period of time in such a 
way that no direct confrontation between the Cambridge ordinance 
and General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 2, may ever occur. 
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§15.1. 1 Pursuant to G.L., c. 185, §l(j 1;2); c. 240, §I4A. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 661, 215 N.E.2d 829. 
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§15.2. Trailers. In Lupo v. Town of Stow l the Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld a ruling of the Land Court in a proceeding under Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 240, Section 14A, that campers, travel trailers, 
mobile camp units and the like used by campers for sleeping quarters, 
eating and cooking on petitioner's public camp ground were in viola-
tion of the local by-law. The law provided: "No trailer shall be moved 
onto any lot within the town for use as a dwelling." The conclusion 
necessarily followed even though the facilities were not permanent. 
The Court also noted: "No question has been presented as to the 
validity of this exercise of the zoning power ... ," which leaves open 
the question of the right of the towns to prohibit the parking of the 
ever increasing influx of campers and travel trailers in vacation areas. 
§15.3. Interpretation of zoning laws. In Harrison v. Building In-
spector of Braintree,! in a petition for mandamus to enforce a zoning 
by-law, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the owner of land in an 
industrial district adjacent to a residential district may not use land 
in the adjacent residential zone as access roadways for its industrial 
plant. The petitioners argued that, when the rear of their land was 
rezoned industrial, the only access to it being through residential land, 
there was a rezoning by implication of the residential land. Then they 
argued that the zoning must include industrial access to the rear land, 
as any other interpretation would mean that their rear land would 
not be accessible for the present industrial use of a factory that had 
been built and was in operation, employing several hundred employees. 
The Court held: "There is no basis in the statute or in the nature of 
zoning for adding uses by implication to one zone to make reasonable 
the classification of another zone."2 The Court, recognizing the prob-
lem caused by its decision, suspended the effective date of its decision 
for three months to allow "orderly municipal action" to provide legal 
access. This presumably would mean a rezoning, at least in part, of the 
front land. This case points up the need for a detailed and exhaustive 
study of the zoning laws before commercial property is developed. 
The courts can hardly be expected to exceed their remedial jurisdic-
tion and thus in benevolence to rectify one's folly. 
The Court was again faced with the interpretation of a zoning by-
law in the case of Beechwood Acres, Inc. v. Town of Hamilton} in 
which the zoning by-law established zone boundaries by referring solely 
to the zoning map. The Court held that although a zoning by-law 
should define zone boundaries by metes and bounds, a mere reference 
to a zoning map was adequate in this case since the zoning map was 
sufficiently specific as to scale and fixed points to permit ascertainment 
with certainty of the location of the zoning boundaries. It is important 
that the Court upheld a zoning law establishing zoning boundaries by 
§15.2. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 429, 215 N.E.2d 88. 
§15.3. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 597, 215 N.E.2d 773. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 600, 215 N.E.2d at 775. 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 216 N.E.2d 94. See also §15.15 infra. 
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reference to a zoning map, this being historically a common practice 
of a considerable number of cities and towns. 
§15.4. Spot zoning. In the case of Fiorenza v. Town of Arlington! 
the Supreme Judicial Court was faced with an amendment that changed 
the zoning of 12,000 square feet of land from "Residence B" to "Resi-
dence C." The amendment presumably would authorize the construc-
tion of an apartment house on the tract. The Court easily upheld the 
lower court's decision that the amendment was clearly spot zoning 
and invalid. 
In Mahoney v. Commissioner of Public Works of Lowell2 the Court, 
again faced with a zoning amendment changing the classification of a 
small one-owner locus from residential to industrial, affirmed an order 
that upheld its validity. The Court found as a fact that the locus had 
taken on substantially the same characteristics as the non-residence 
districts surrounding it even though nominally the locus was in a 
residence district. In issue was the legality of a zoning amendment 
which affected only the property of VFW Post 662; the amendment 
rezoned the premises from general residential use to industrial use. 
The Court stated that, although the zoning of a particular parcel 
owned by a single individual or entity might at first glance be spot 
zoning, other considerations were pertinent. For example, the property 
was at the edge of a general residence district and was bounded on the 
remaining three sides by business and industrial districts. Further-
more, the Court found that the local legislature could properly deter-
mine that the property had taken on a non-residential character by 
virtue of its surroundings and could be fairly incorporated into one 
of the adjacent non-residential zones. This case is a good example of 
the necessity in zoning amendment cases of presenting a detailed de-
scription not only of the locus but of all the surrounding land. Failure 
to do so may cause the apparent creation of an "island" zone which 
the courts will necessarily find to be spot zoning. 
§15.5. Variances. In Aronson v. Board of Appeals of Stoneham l 
the Supreme Judicial Court overturned the grant of a variance by the 
Board of Appeals, after the grant was upheld by the Superior Court. 
This case is an excellent example of how the Court will review the 
facts and draw from them all reasonable conclusions necessary to de-
termine whether all the statutory prerequisites for the granting of a 
variance have been met. The property owner applied for a variance 
from the side-yard restriction in order to build a porch for an invalid 
child, contending that the proposed location was the only feasible one. 
He also proved that his house was constructed by a prior owner in vio-
lation of the side-yard requirements but that this violation was not 
brought to his attention until sometime after he purchased the prop-
erty. The Court, notwithstanding the Board's findings that all the 
§15.4. l349 Mass. 771, 211 N.E.2d 342 (1965). 
2 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 994, 218 N.E.2d 122. 
§15.5. 1349 Mass. 539, 211 N.E.2d 228 (1965). 
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necessary statutory elements for a variance existed, held that the evi-
dence did not support these findings and thus the grant of the variance. 
The existing zoning violation, even though not attributable to the 
present owner, was not a condition "especially affecting such parcel, 
but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located;" 
a zoning violation cannot be made the basis upon which this variance 
requirement can be met. The Court also found that the Superior 
Court, although it made a general finding of hardship, did not make a 
specific finding to this effect. Even if it had done so, however, the evi-
dence as to an invalid child was insufficient to establish the type of 
hardship contemplated by the statute. In any event, the Court finally 
held, when a proposed variance would extend an existing violation 
on a lot, a determination may not be made under the statute that 
"relief may be granted without nullifying or substantially derogating 
from the intent or purpose of such by-law." 
§15.6. Public utilities: Exemption. In Town of Framingham v. 
Department of Public Utilities! the Supreme Judicial Court was again 
confronted with the exemption of the New York Central Railroad 
from the zoning laws of the town of Framingham. This exemption had 
originally been denied in New York Central R.R. v. Department of 
Public Utilities2 because inadequate findings of public necessity were 
made by the Department of Public Utilities. In the present case the 
Court upheld a decision of the Department exempting land owned by 
the New York Central Railroad from operation of the Framingham 
zoning by-law, thus permitting its use as a terminal freight yard. The 
Court held that sufficient findings of fact had been made. 
The Court set forth the factors to be considered in determining 
whether said land "is reasonably necessary for the convenience or wel-
fare of the public"s as follows: (a) the extent of the usefulness of the 
proposed facility to shippers, manufacturers, motor vehicle distribu-
tors and consumers; (b) the suitability of the locus for the proposed 
facility and for the other uses; (c) the probable effect of the facility 
upon the gross and net revenues of the railroad, and upon the rail-
road's ability to continue to perform its intrastate and interstate pub-
lic functions; (d) the effect of the facility upon highway congestion; 
(e) the possibility that injury to abutting owners can be minimized by 
proper screening by trees and otherwise; and (f) the relative advantages 
and disadvantages from the standpoint of public welfare and con-
venience. 
§15.7. Special permits. In Slater v. Board of Appeals of Brookline! 
the Supreme Judicial Court upheld with modification an order of the 
Superior Court, which had annulled the decision of the Board of 
§15.6. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 989, 218 N.E.2d 89. 
2347 Mass. 586, 205 N.E.2d 3 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§13.8, 
14.10, 16.3. 
8 As required by C.L., c. 40A, §1O. 
§15.7. 1350 Mass. 70, 213 N.E.2d 394 (1966). 
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Appeals denying a special permit. The by-law gave the Board authority 
to issue special permits for residential parking areas on lots that were 
located within 400 feet of and within the same zoning district as the 
lots whose residents were to be served. The conditions to be met under 
the by-law were in substance that (1) the location be appropriate, 
(2) the parking use not adversely affect the neighborhood, (3) it not 
constitute a nuisance or serious hazard, and (4) adequate and appro-
priate facilities be provided for proper operation of the facility. The 
applicant in the present case not only owned the lot upon which the 
apartment building was located, but also owned two other lots which 
were both suitable for parking. He applied for a special permit for 
parking on one of these lots. The Board denied the permit, even 
though it found that the premises described in the application met the 
requirements for a special permit under the by-law, on the ground that 
the applicant had other land, the second lot, which was more appro-
priately located for parking in relation to the apartment building to 
be served. The Court held th30t the refusal to issue the permi twas 
improper since all requirements were met. A Board of Appeals may 
not refuse to issue a permit for reasons unrelated to the standards 
of the by-Iaw.2 
The Court modified the lower court's decree so as to permit the 
Board to make certain factual determinations as of the first instance, 
rather than have the court do so. 
In Medeiros v. Board of Aldermen of Woburn3 the ordinance of the 
city of Woburn, enacted under the enabling provision of General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 4, required, prior to the erection of a 
motor vehicle station, a special permit from the Board of Aldermen. 
The ordinance further provided that any such special permit issued 
must contain a set of conditions covering specifically, among other 
things, the hours of operation and mode of lighting. The Court sus-
tained the lower court's decree which had held that the issuance of 
the special permit was invalid. The Board of Aldermen had not only 
failed to comply with the ordinance's requirement for setting out con-
ditions for the permit but also had not complied with General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 4,4 which requires the giving of notice to the 
planning board of Woburn prior to the hearing on the permit. This 
case reminds us forcefully that a petitioner must not only be con-
cerned with his own statutory compliance but also he will be selfishly 
as well as unselfishly wise to become "his brother's keeper," in assuring 
that the Board strictly adheres to the law, both procedural and sub-
stantive, state and local. 
§15.8. Amendments: Hearing procedure. In Woods v. City of 
Newton 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with the validity 
2 Mahoney v. Board of Appeals of Winchester, 344 Mass. 598, 183 N.E.2d 850 
(1962), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.6. 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 281, 213 N.E.2d 921. 
4 G.L., c. 40A, § 4, incorporates c. 40A, §17. 
§15.8. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 957, 217 N.E.2d 728. 
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of a zoning amendment of the city of Newton. When this amendment 
was first before the Court,2 the case was remanded on procedural 
grounds. After a hearing in Superior Court the case again came before 
the Supreme Judicial Court for consideration on various issues, one of 
them being the propriety of the adoption of an amendment to the 
zoning ordinance whereby certain land was rezoned from Residence C 
to Business AA. Under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 6, no 
zoning ordinance or by-law, including both original zoning and later 
amendments thereto, can be adopted by the local legislature, which 
in this case was the Board of Aldermen, until a public hearing thereon 
has been held by the Planning Board. The statute further provides 
that not only must a duly advertised public hearing be held by the 
Planning Board, but also that such a duly advertised public hearing 
has to be held before the local legislature or a committee thereof. The 
commonly accepted belief was that this required separate hearings, the 
first to be before the Planning Board. In the present case both the 
Planning Board and Aldermanic committee held a joint public hear-
ing at the same time and place. The Court held that this procedure 
complied with the notice provision under General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 6, since nothing in the statute prohibits joint meetings. The 
Court further stated that in some instances, as in the case in question, 
public convenience may be best served by joint meetings rather than 
the customary independent meetings of the respective boards. 
§15.9. Procedure: Adoption of amendment. In Longo v. City of 
Malden 1 the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the validity of a 1946 
zoning amendment placing the plaintiff's property in a residence zone. 
The report of the planning board described the area to be rezoned as 
an "industrial and apartment house district," when in fact it was a 
business district. In addition the board's "recommendation," pursuant 
to General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 6, was merely a vote "to ap-
prove the request for rezoning." The Court noted th-at the statute only 
requires the planning board to consider a proposed rezoning and 
recommend approval or disapproval. The petitioner was not preju-
diced by the inaccurate report, since his property can be used now as 
in the past as a valid nonconforming use. This case again demon-
strates the Court's wisdom in looking to substance rather than form. 
§15.10. Building permit and subsequent zoning change: Necessity 
of proceeding with construction. In Papalia v. Inspector of Buildings 
of Watertown 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was confronted with the 
continued validity of a building permit issued prior to a zoning amend-
ment. General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 11, provides: 
No zoning by-law or amendment thereof shall affect any permit 
issued or any building or structure lawfully begun before notice 
of hearing before the planning board ... has first been given or 
2349 Mass. 373, 208 N.E.2d 508 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.13. 
§15.9. 11965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1523, 213 N.E.2d 387. 
§15.l0. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1043, 217 N.E.2d 911. 
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before the issuance of the warrant for the town meeting at which 
such by-law or amendment is adopted, whichever comes first; 
provided, that construction work under such a permit is com-
menced within six months after its issue, and the work, whether 
under such permit or otherwise lawfully begun, proceeds in good 
faith continuously to completion so far as is reasonably prac-
ticable under the circumstances. 
On February 28, 1964, the plaintiff was issued permits for the con-
struction of an apartment house on his premises and the razing of the 
residence presently thereon. The permits were issued prior to notice 
of a hearing on a proposed zoning change, which as adopted precluded 
the erection of the proposed apartment house. Domestic difficulties 
kept the plaintiff from razing the house, as his wife would not leave. 
In August, 1964, the lines of the new apartment house were laid out 
and the excavation for the footings was begun. Part of the footings was 
eventually poured but nothing further was done. The plaintiff's prob-
lems were further complicated by health difficulties which necessitated 
his hospitalization. In January, 1965, the Probate Court ordered that 
his wife was to have the use of the home. The plaintiff tried constantly 
to find a new house for his wife and children, but nothing pleased her. 
Finally she moved out. While the plaintiff was arranging to have the 
house razed, he received a letter from the building inspector dated 
April 20, 1965, notifying him that his permit was void. The plaintiff 
argued that at all times and in good faith he acted so as to complete 
the work permitted as rapidly as was reasonable. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court held that the "circumstances" referred to in the statute2 
concern incidents of the construction process and not the domestic or 
personal difficulties of the permit holder, saying: "We do not believe 
that the Legislature intended the courts in a case involving a zoning 
by-law to hear evidence relating to marital problems." 
§15.11. Building permit: Improper suspension. In Alexander v. 
Building Inspector of Provincetown,l a case involving an unusual fact 
situation, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the failure of an owner 
to apply for a new building permit after his original permit had been 
suspended improperly and subsequently reinstated did not result in 
his losing rights under the permit for zoning amendment exemption. 
The letter of the Town Counsel to the building inspector ruling that 
the permit had been improperly suspended was sent one day before 
the publication by the planning board of a notice of a zoning change 
which would prohibit the construction covered by the permit. The 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the owner was not deprived of the 
protection afforded by General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section II, re-
quiring that work under the permit be commenced within six months 
after permit issue and that work proceeds in good faith continually to 
2 G.L., c. 40A, §1I. 
§15.11. 1350 Mass. 370, 214 N.E.2d 876 (1966). 
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completion. The owner failed to apply for a new permit in reliance 
on a statement of a town official that a new application was not neces-
sary, the original permit being reinstated. The Court held that the six 
month's period would run from January 21, 1965, the date of reinstate-
ment. On the issue of reliance upon an opinion of the municipality's 
attorney, this case must be distinguished from the case of Building 
Inspector of Malden v. Werlin Realty, Inc. 2 Had the owner in the 
present case applied for a new permit he would have been entitled 
to its issuance, whereas in the Werlin case the applicant, notwithstand-
ing the written opinion of the city solicitor, was never entitled to the 
relief requested. 
§15.12. Procedure: Notice of appeal. In Greeley v. Zoning Board 
of Appeals of Framinghaml the Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
Board was without jurisdiction to review a decision of the building 
inspector when the appeal had been filed with counsel for the Board, 
rather than with the City Clerk,2 even though notice of the appeal was 
given to all parties. A subsequent filing with the Clerk after the 30-
day statutory period was likewise held not to confer jurisdiction. 
The Court also held that the appeal from the decision of the Board 
of Appeals to the Superior Court under General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 21, was not invalid because of the plaintiff's failure to attach a 
certified copy of the Board's decision to its bill of complaint, since the 
required copies were subsequently attached on motion, made and 
allowed within the 20-day filing period required under the statute. 
In essence, the Court's decision allowed the building permit to stand 
but did suggest that the abutters could file a petition for writ of man-
damus to enforce the zoning ordinance. This case should be distin-
guished from the cases of Bearce v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brock-
tonS and Simeone Stone Corp. v. Oliva.4 In those cases the notices filed 
by the appellant were both timely and proper, and the defect was in 
the subsequent pleadings. In the Greeley case notice was first im-
properly served and then was not timely, thereby initially and per-
manently depriving the Board of Appeals of jurisdiction. 
§15.13. Appeal: Reference to master; authority of board of appeals. 
In Garelick v. Board of Appeals of Franklin l the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered the propriety of referring a zoning appeal brought 
in the Superior Court pursuant to General Laws, Chapter 40A, Sec-
tion 21, to a master. It found that although a judge sitting in equity 
has the inherent power to refer the matter to a master, "the purposes 
sought to be achieved will best be accomplished and the procedure be 
more consonant with the legislative intent if the evidence is heard 
2349 Mass. 623, 211 N.E.2d 338 (1965), noted in §15.19 infra. 
§15.l2. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 587, 215 N.E.2d 791. 
2 As specifically required by G.L., c. 40A, §16. 
S 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1213, 219 N.E.2d 15, noted in §15.l6 infra. 
4350 Mass. 31, 213 N.E.2d 230 (1965), noted in §15.l7 infra. 
§15.l3. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 283, 214 N.E.2d 60. 
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and the facts determined by a judge on' an appeal under that statute."2 
On the substantive issue, the Court found that the Board of Appeals 
had exceeded its authority in refusing to hear an appeal until the 
applicant submitted plans for the construction of four apartments of 
three rooms each, when the applicant had appealed from a denial of 
his application for a permit to construct five apartments. This case is 
similar to Slater v. Board of Appeals of Brookline,S in that in both 
cases the Board's decision was not responsive to the petition of the 
applicant. 
§15.14. Jurisdiction of Superior Court. In Sandberg v. Board of 
Appeals of Taunton,! the city's superintendent of buildings refused to 
issue a building permit on the grounds that the building would violate 
the zoning ordinance. An appeal from his decision was heard by a 
Board of Appeals established under the city's building code, rather 
than by a zoning Board of Appeals, as no such board had been estab-
lished by the city. The Superior Court was without jurisdiction to 
consider an appeal brought pursuant to General Laws, Chapter 40A, 
Section 21, since this section is confined to appeals under the zoning 
enabling act. The Supreme Judicial Court in this case did not take 
the opportunity to decide whether the failure to establish a zoning 
Board of Appeals, a requirement of General Laws, Chapter 40A, Sec-
tion 14, invalidates the entire zoning by-law, even though this question 
was raised. 
§15.15. Procedure: Appeal at law or in equity. In Beechwood 
Acres, Inc. v. Town of Hamilton1 the petitioner sought a determina-
tion of the validity of the Hamilton by-law, relying specifically on both 
General Laws, Chapter 185, Section I (j:Y2) , and Chapter 240, Section 
14A, for authority to bring its petition in the Land Court. The town 
contended that Beechwood's appeal was filed too late because it was 
not claimed within 20 days of the judge's decision, as required in a 
proceeding on the law side of the Land Court.2 The petition, although 
entitled Bill of Complaint, alleged that there was no adequate relief 
at law and facts to show the existence of a controversy. But it made no 
explicit reference to declaratory relief under General Laws, Chapter 
231A, and gave no clear or adequate indication that it sought relief 
in equity. The Supreme Judicial Court held the petition under Sec-
tion l(j%) to be an action on the law side of the Land Court and ruled 
that the appeal was thus filed too late. To avoid further litigation, 
since all issues had been briefed and argued, the Court ruled on the 
merits, but this certainly is no guarantee that it would do so in every 
case. Appellate procedures in zoning matters, whether from decisions 
2Id. at 283, 214 N.E.2d at 61. 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 27, 213 N.E.2d 393, noted in §15.7 supra. 
§15.l4. 1349 Mass. 769, 211 N.E.2d 341 (1965). 
§15.15. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 715, 216 N.E.2d 94, also noted in §15.3 supra. 
2 This provision applies because of cross reference in the Land Court procedure 
to that employed in the Superior Court. C.L., c. 185, §15; c. 231, §96. 
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of building inspectors, Boards of Appeals, the Land Court or the Su-
perior Court are governed by the type of relief sought. It is stating an 
obvious but not always followed rule that care must be taken to avoid 
procedural pitfalls such as those presented in the present case. 
§15.16. Jurisdiction of board of appeals: Authority and notice. 
In Bearce v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Brockton1 the Board revoked 
a building permit on the ground that the zoning amendments upon 
which the superintendent of buildings had relied were improper and 
illegal. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the powers of the Board2 
do not include the power to nullify acts of the local legislative body, 
which is empowered to adopt and amend zoning by-Iaws.s On a pro-
cedural issue the Court held that the failure of the plaintiff's affidavit 
to indicate service of the bill on the City Clerk, as required by General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 21, did not deprive the Superior Court of 
jurisdiction if, in fact, notice was given ... 'Jurisdiction depends on the 
fact of the notice, not on whether it was pleaded. If given ... but not 
set out in the pleadings ... through inadvertence, manifestly an ap-
propriate occasion would be presented for allowance of an amendment 
of the bill ... .' "4 
§15.17. Procedure: Contents of notice. In Simeone Stone Corp. v. 
Oliva1 the Supreme Judicial Court held that a decision of a zoning 
board of appeals based on a reason not specified in the notice of appeal 
or in the notices of hearing served by the board on the petitioner did 
not deprive the board of jurisdiction. In the present case testimony on 
all issues raised by the appeal was presented to the board so that the 
failure of the board to decide upon the reasons specified in the notice 
of appeal was not prejudicial; the landowner clearly had adequate 
notice of what charges he had to meet and equally clearly his testi-
mony sought to meet these arguments. 
§15.18. Nonconforming use: Change of use. In Building Inspector 
of Malden v. Werlin Realty, Inc. 1 the Supreme Judicial Court ex-
amined the specific use made of the premises prior to the enactment of 
a zoning ordinance, rather than the degree of objectionability of uses, 
to determine the validity of a nonconforming use. Prior to the enact-
ment of the zoning ordinance the locus had been used for the manu-
facture and storage of oxygen products. From that time (1928) to the 
date of the zoning ordinance placing the locus in a general residential 
zone (1963), the locus was used for the manufacture and storage of 
hospital equipment and the cleaning of rugs. Subsequent to the enact-
ment of the 1963 zoning ordinance, the locus was purchased and used 
§15.16. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1213, 219 N.E.2d 15, 
2 Set out in G.L., c. 40A, §§13, 15. 
SId. §6. 
4 Quoting from Carey v. Planning Board of Revere, 335 Mass. 740, 745, 139 
N.E.2d 920, 924 (1957), at 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1213, 1217,219 N.E.2d 15, 18. 
§15.l7. 1350 Mass. 31, 213 N.E.2d 230 (1965). 
§15.18. 1349 Mass. 623, 211 N.E.2d 338 (1965). 
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by the defendant for the storage of ice cream cones and straws. The 
Court held that, although the present use was less objectionable than 
prior uses, this was not the issue in determining if the present use 
could continue. The different quality of the new use made it invalid. 
This conclusion restates the accepted rule in the Commonwealth.2 
In Superintendent and Inspector of Buildings of Cambridge v. Vil-
laris the Court upheld the validity of an extension of a nonconforming 
use. The premises from 1935 to 1947 were used as a "volume gas sta-
tion" but minor automobile repairs were not performed on the locus 
until after 1947, some 23 years after the zoning ordinance was adopted. 
The Court held, however, that the making of minor repairs was inci-
dental to the operation of a service station and was part of its original 
nature and purpose, even though the power to make such repairs was 
not exercised at all times, when the general use was nonconforming 
under the ordinance. 
In another nonconforming use case, Town of Bridgewater v. Chuck-
ran}4 the Court took the opportunity to summarize the three major 
standards used for determining whether a current use fits within the 
exemption granted to the nonconforming uses: (1) whether the use 
reflects the "nature and purpose" of the use prevailing when the zon-
ing by-law took effect;5 (2) whether there is a difference in the quality 
or character as well as the degree of use;6 (3) whether current use is 
"different in kind in its effect on the neighborhood."7 Applying these 
standards the Court held that a change in use from the storage of 
building materials and maintenance of a small concrete mixer with a 
capacity of four cubic yards, to the establishment of a business, the 
major enterprise of which was to supply concrete to others, together 
with an increase in concrete mixing capacity to 35 cubic yards, was an 
invalid extension of a nonconforming use. 
§15.19. Opinion of city solicitor: Reliance. In Building Inspector 
of Malden v. Werlin Realty} Inc. 1 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the reliance by the owner of the locus on the written opinion of 
the city solicitor, given prior to the purchase of the property, that the 
2 The Court cited numerous relevant cases for its conclusion. 
S 350 Mass. 176, 213 N.E.2d 861 (1966). 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 867, 217 N.E.2d 726. 
5 Citing Superintendent and Inspector of Buildings of Cambridge v. Villari, 1966 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 213 N.E.2d 861, discussed in text supported by note 3 supra; 
Massachusetts Broken Stone Co. v. Town of Weston, 346 Mass. 657, 195 N.E.2d 522 
(1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.7. 
6 Citing Building Inspector of Malden v. Werlin Realty, Inc., 1965 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 289, 211 N.E.2d 338, discussed in text supported by notes 1 and 2 supra; Brady 
v. Board of Appeals of Westport, 348 Mass. 515, 204 N.E.2d 513 (1965), noted in 1965 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l5. 
7 Citing City of Medford v. Marinucci Brothers & Co., 344 Mass. 50, 181 N.E.2d 
584 (1962), noted in 1962 Ann. S'urv. Mass. Law §§13.4, 13.5, 18.20, and cases cited 
therein. . 
§15.19. 1349 Mass. 623, 211 N.E.2d 338 (1965), also noted in §15.l8 supra. See 
also §15.l1 supra. 
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proposed use of the owner would be a valid nonconforming use, did 
not give the owner the right to violate the zoning ordinance.2 
§15.20. Exemption from zoning regulations: Retroactive applica-
tion. In Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis,l the Supreme Judicial 
Court had for its consideration a further stage of two previous cases, 
Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis,2 and Doliner v. Town Clerk of 
Millis.a The sequence of events is crucial and will be briefly stated. On 
March 9, 1959, the town voted to repeal an existing by-law setting 
forth building lot size, and enacted in its place a new by-law increasing 
lot size, which was to take effect after approval by the Attorney Gen-
eral. On April I, 1959, the Town Clerk transmitted the new by-law to 
the Attorney General, who approved it on June 9, 1959. In the interim, 
the subdivider filed with the Planning Board a definitive subdivision 
plan, the lot sizes of which complied with the prior zoning by-law. 
Under the new by-law then awaiting the Attorney General's approval, 
however, the said lots were inadequate in size. The subdivision plan 
was disapproved by the Planning Board on May 26, 1959, without a 
public hearing being held, on the grounds that the lots shown on the 
plan did not comply with the size requirements to the new zoning 
by-law. The case was subsequently appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, and the Court annulled the decision of the Planning Board and 
remanded the plan to them for further consideration and a public 
hearing. On April 24, 1962, the Planning Board held a public hearing 
on the original definitive plan, and disapproved it on May 7, 1962, on 
the stated ground that it did not comply with the new zoning by-law, 
which was the same reason given in the original disapproval. The 
Supreme Judicial Court upheld disapproval of the plan in the present 
case. The subdivider was subject to the zoning by-law increasing lot 
size, which was adopted on March 9, 1959, and he was not entitled, 
under General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 7 A, to the benefit of the 
previously existing zoning by-law authorizing the smaller lots as shown 
on the subdivision plan. 
The Court also held that the 1961 amendment to General Laws, 
Chapter 40A, Section 7A,4 did not apply to this plan, since the Plan-
ning Board's original disapproval preceded the effective date of this 
amendment. The amendment was designed to afford the protection 
of the statute to definitive plans against changes in zoning made from 
the date of their being filed; Section 7 A prior to this date gave protec-
tion only to definitive plans approved by the local Planning Board. 
Furthermore, the Court found that in cases in which only a definitive 
subdivision was submitted, until the adoption of the 1961 amendment 
2 The Court distinguished Chilson v. Zoning Board of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 
Mass. 406, 182 N.E.2d 535 (1962). 
§15.20. 1349 Mass. 691, 212 N.E.2d 460 (1965). 
2343 Mass. 1, 175 N.E.2d 919 (1961), noted in 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.10, 
12.13, 12.15, 18.32; see also 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.3. 
a 343 Mass. 10, 175 N.E.2d 925 (1961). See note 2 supra. 
4 Acts of 1961, c. 435, §2. 
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which was not applicable here, no protection was afforded such plans 
during the processing period until they were approved. The Court 
found that the 1961 amendment operated prospectively and not retro-
actively, citing Building Inspector of Acton v. Board of Appeals of 
Acton.5 
The remaining question left for the Court was the effect of Acts of 
1965, Chapter 366,6 which amended Section 7A of Chapter 40A by in-
creasing the period from five to seven years and, more importantly, 
provided that the "provisions of this act shall apply to plans sub-
mitted to planning boards prior to its effective date." The Court held 
that the 1965 amendment was not sufficiently explicit so as to be 
interpreted to apply retroactively to the changes adopted by the 1961 
statute. In effect, the Court held that, at least in the case of a non-
approved subdivision that had been filed prior to the 1961 amend-
ment, the 1965 amendment did not apply retroactively. It noted the 
legislative right to provide for such relief if it wished. It stated, how-
ever, that the retroactive effect sought would have to be expressed 
explicitly, it being so unusual as not to permit relying upon inference. 
The Court was not about to give a retroactive interpretation of the 
statute, especially in this case where the town had already voted to 
change the by-law increasing the lot size, and the definitive subdivision 
plan was submitted subsequent to the vote, during the period the town 
was awaiting approval from the Attorney General. 
This decision, by implication at least, gives retroactive interpreta-
tion to the provisions of Section 7A in cases in which a definitive sub-
division was approved, either prior or subsequent to the 1961 amend-
ment, by a planning board, especially in cases in which the zoning 
change in question was adopted after the date of the approval of the 
subdivision plan. Left unanswered is the question of the possible retro-
activity of Section 7A in cases in which a preliminary plan or the defi-
nitive plan was submitted to a planning board subsequent to the 1961 
amendment and, during the period the plan was being processed, the 
zoning by-law was changed by the municipality. 
§15.21. Legislation. General Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 4, was 
amended by Acts of 1966, Chapters 26 and 199. The amendments 
changed the quorum and voting requirements of a City Council desig-
nated by a zoning ordinance to hear and consider applications for 
special permits. Under the prior statute, the entire City Councilor a 
proper quorum was required to sit at the hearing and if the Council 
consisted of four or fewer members a unanimous vote was necessary for 
effective action. If the Council consists of more than four members, all 
but 'one of the members had to concur for effective action. Under the 
new statute, a City Council of more than five members (originally 15, 
but reduced to five by Chapter 199) designated to hear and consider 
special permits, may appoint a committee of its members to hear the 
5348 Mass. 453, 204 N.E.2d 296 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.12. 
6 See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.19. 
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matter, but in any event two thirds of all the members of the City 
Council, and not two thirds of the committee, must concur for effec-
tive action. 
B. SUBDIVISION CONTROL 
§15.22. Notice of final action: Sixty-day period. In Pinecrest, Inc. 
v. Planning Board of Billerica1 the Board disapproved a subdivision 
after a public hearing duly advertised, and within the 60-day period 
in which the Board must act, and filed a "Certificate of Final Action" 
with the Town Clerk which merely stated, "Disapproved - Improper 
Drainage." The Board, however, failed to give notice of its action to 
the developer as required by General Laws, Chapter 41, Section SIU. 
The developer, although it did not receive notice, was able, however, 
to file its appeal under General Laws, Chapter 41, Section SIBB, 
within the 20-day period. Section Sl U provides in part: 
Failure of the planning board either to take final action or to file 
with the city or town clerk a certificate of such action regarding a 
plan submitted by an applicant within sixty days after such sub-
mission, or such further time as may be agreed upon at the written 
request of the applicant, shall be deemed to be an approval 
thereof. Notice of such extension of time shall be filed forth-
with by the planning board with the city or town clerk. 
The Court held that notwithstanding the slipshod procedure of the 
Board and its violations not only of the statute but also of its own 
rules and regulations, its action was sufficient to prevent its blundering 
into a constructive approval of the plan under Section SI U. Still to be 
decided in an appropriate case is whether the Court would reach a 
similar decision if the developer had failed to file a timely appeal 
under Section SIBB because of its failure to receive the statutory 
notice from the Board.2 
§15.23. Certificate of Town Clerk: Failure of board to act. In 
Waldor Realty Corp. v. Town Clerk of Bellingham1 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court upheld the dismissal of writ of mandamus to order the 
Town Clerk to execute a certificate that no notice of final action had 
been filed in the Town Clerk's office and that no notice of appeal had 
been received by him, as provided by Chapter 41, Section SIV. The 
developer in this case submitted a plan to the Planning Board for 
approval as a subdivision and a public hearing was held. Sixty days 
elapsed from the date of the submission and the Board not only failed 
to give notice of final action within this 60-day period but also failed 
to take any action whatsoever on the plan. The developer, proceeding 
§15.22. 1350 Mass. 336, 214 N.E.2d 868 (1966). 
2 Relevant would be the case of Pieper v. Planning Board of Southborough, 340 
Mass. 157, 163 N.E.2d 14 (1959), noted in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.7, 13.7, 
13.11, and briefly discussed at 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 341, 343, 214 N.E.2d 868, 869. 
§15.23. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 739, 216 N.E.2d 453. 
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under the provisions of General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 81V, re-
quested the Town Clerk to execute a certificate which would have 
indicated that, "according to the records of his office, there was sub-
mitted to the planning board for its approval a definitive plan dated 
August 4, 1960, of a subdivision of land owned by Lee Realty Trust; 
that no notice of final action by the board under G. L. c. 41, §81U ... 
was received by the clerk before October 7, 1960; and that no notice 
of appeal was received by him before October 27, 1960, in accordance 
with G. L. c. 41, §8IBB. ... " General Laws, Chapter 41 Section 81V, 
provides in part: 
In case of the approval of a plan by reason of the failure of the 
planning board to act within the time prescribed, the city or town 
clerk shall, after the expiration of twenty days without notice of 
appeal to the superior court, or, if appeal has been taken, after 
receipt of certified records of the superior court indicating that 
such approval has become final, issue a certificate stating the date 
of the submission of the plan for approval, the fact that the 
planning board failed to take final action and that the approval 
resulting from such failure has become final. The ... plan and 
such certificate, as the case may be, shall be delivered by the plan-
ning board, or in the case of the certificate, by the city or town 
clerk, to the person who submitted such plan. 
The Court held that the certificate requested of the Town Clerk was 
deficient since it failed to set forth certain necessary facts, among 
which were that the Planning Board failed to take final action and 
that the approval resulting from this failure had become final.2 The 
Court, although admitting that the petition for writ of mandamus 
inferentially alleged that the Board failed to take action, held that the 
allegations set forth were not clear, direct and unequivocal and there-
fore properly subject to demurrer. This case clearly demonstrates the 
necessity of following to the letter the statutory requirements when 
proceeding in cases in which relief sought is solely statutory. One may 
compare the Court's relaxed attitude as to statutory prerequisites in 
the case of Pinecrest, Inc. v. Planning Board of Billerica,S although 
that case involved solely subdivision control policies, not the complexi-
ties and technicalities of the writ of mandamus and demurrers thereto. 
§15.24. Legislation. General Laws, Chapter 41, Section 8IX, was 
amended by Acts of 1966, Chapter 380, by adding a provision which 
now permits a Registrar of Deeds to accept for recording, and the 
Land Court to accept with a petition for registration or confirmation 
of title, subdivision plans that do not have the previously required 
appropriate planning board endorsement. The new exception is 
limited to plans drawn by a registered land surveyor, and which bear 
2 The Court also noted that there was no allegation of the expiration of the 20-
day appeal period or none of the date upon which the plan was originally submitted. 
s 350 Mass. 336, 214 N.E.2d 868 (1966), noted in §15.22 supra. 
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his certificate that property lines, street lines and ways shown on the 
plans are existing boundary and street lines and that no new lines for 
division of existing ownership or for new ways are shown. This amend-
ment is apparently limited from a practical standpoint to the record-
ing of "subdivision approval not required"-type plans, .without this 
endorsement being placed on the plans by the planning board. A 
careful examination should be made, prior to any recording, in order 
to ascertain whether a particular plan qualifies for this exemption. 
One may question whether a plan recorded under this amendment, 
without the endorsement of the planning board, is afforded the bene-
fits of the exemption from zoning changes provided under General 
Laws, Chapter 40A, Section 5A, in cases in which the owner does not 
hold the land shown on the plan separate and apart from adjoining 
land. 
C. EMINENT DOMAIN 
§15.25. Damages: Interest from time of taking. Town of Swamp-
scott v. Remisl is unique as the first case decided under Chapter 80A 
of the General Laws. Chapter 80A governs a particular type of taking 
by judicial proceedings as opposed to the administrative procedure 
under Chapter 79, and has been but seldom used in the Common-
wealth since its adoption in 1929.2 The actual issue of the case was a 
very narrow one, i.e., whether the failure to grant interest upon the 
damages awarded for the period prior to the date of the entry of judg-
ment was an unconstitutional failure to give adequate compensation. 
The land, fronting on the Atlantic, was the subject of a 1961 town 
meeting vote to take for swimming and other recreational purposes. 
The order of intention to take, required by Section 2 of General Laws, 
Chapter 80A, was adopted by the selectmen on February 6, 1964. The 
landowners remained in possession up to the time of this suit, which 
was the town's petition to establish its right to take the property as 
well as to determine damages. Section 12 of Chapter 80A makes the 
entry of the judgment of condemnation the time of the taking, with 
interest payable only from that date. 
The respondent landowners claimed that, as their land became un-
marketable upon the commencement of the town's proceedings in 
1961, they should be given interest for loss of use and reduction in 
value for the period prior to the actual taking by court judgment. The 
Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention, citing ample authority 
from Massachusetts, federal and other state decisions. It was clear 
enough from the facts that the land was still usable by the owners, 
although the Court indicated that a reduction in value occurred with 
the adoption of the order of intention to take, if not earlier. In the 
conventional language of eminent domain precedents, the Court noted 
that fluctuations of value caused by the potential exercise of the gov-
§15.25. l350 Mass. 523, 215 N.E.2d 777 (1966). 
2 G.L., c. 80A, adopted by Acts of 1929, c. 380, §l. 
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ernmental power of eminent domain are mere incidents of ownership 
to which essentially all property in the Commonwealth is subject. The 
Court did recognize that this may not result in a perfectly fair measure 
of damages, but suggested that the remedy should come from the 
legislature. On the constitutional plane, however, the Court was un-
willing to overturn long-established precedents supported by the statu-
tory language. Such reticence was proper and probably wise. But the 
constitutional doctrines surrounding just compensation were devel-
oped in a society facing altogether different problems from those 
faced today. The limitations of the constitutional formula have been 
recognized by the adoption of many statutes that remedy grossly in-
adequate damages awards.s The solution may properly be one to be 
left to the legislature rather than to be developed by a change of consti-
tutional doctrine,4 but failure of the legislature to act may create the 
necessity for constitutional change. The present case, however, involved 
no major economic loss and certainly is not the case that would tempt 
a court to expand the narrow constitutional limitations laid down by 
the long-established and often-followed precedents. 
§15.26. Damages: Admissible evidence. When dealing with the 
question of the admissibility of opinion evidence on the amount of 
damages resulting from a taking by eminent domain, the Supreme 
Judicial Court was correctly more concerned with the witness' personal 
contact with the property than with his self-characterization as 
"broker," "owner" or "expert appraiser."l In the rescript opinion of 
Gazianis v. Town of Clinton2 testimony of value was admitted not 
because the witness was "part owner" but because he had shown 
"sufficient familiarity with the whole property to give an opinion of 
its value." The lower court in Root v. CommonwealthS was equally 
satisfied that the "daughter and manager of the affairs" of the owner 
possessed this familiarity. In Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turnpike 
Authority4 the Supreme Judicial Court found no error in the trial 
court's sequestration of two expert witnesses. One was not allowed to 
give testimony in the presence of the other in order that the court 
could be assured that each expert opinion was based upon an indepen-
dent analysis of the land. 
3 See Huber, Legal Rights of Persons Whose Businesses Are Displaced aune 1962). 
See also 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.30. The losses often sustained but not consti-
tutionally reimbursed include relocation costs and loss of profit and good will, 
among others. 
4 The relocation statutes adopted by both the federal and Massachusetts legis-
latures are examples of legislative recognition of the inadequacy of the constitu-
tional measure of damages in that such legislation attempts to provide compensation 
for some of the items which the present case held to be noncompensable. See §15.30 
infra. 
§15.26. 1 Burchell v. Commonwealth, 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 517, 215 N.E.2d 
649, 651. 
2 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1519, 212 N.E.2d 854. 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 85, 213 N.E.2d 474. 
4350 Mass. 485, 215 N.E.2d 652 (1966). 
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However, even though a witness had demonstrated a personal 
knowledge of the land, his opinion was excluded when his method of 
evaluation was erroneous. In Gazianis v. Town of Clinton/} the trial 
court refused to allow the witness to value a 24 room tenement by esti-
mating the value of one room and multiplying it by 24. In the more 
complex and significant opinion of H. E. Fletcher Co. v. Common-
wealth6 the Supreme Judicial Court had before it the problems raised 
by a method of providing compensation for the taking of 17.4 acres 
of the petitioner's 1050 acres of granite belt located in Chelmsford and 
Westford. Less than one-half acre of the land taken was in Westford, 
the remainder being in Chelmsford. At the time of taking, this 17.4 
acres "was wild land, traversed only by hunters;"7 but a new quarry 
could have been opened there. The latter possibility was disclosed in 
1960 when the petitioner caused a study to be made of his inactive 
land. This study took place about a year after the taking. One of the 
expert witnesses for the petitioner, Alexander, testified that the entire 
Fletcher property was worth $12 million before the taking and $8 
million after the taking. The bases of his opinion were "the ease of 
extraction, the quality and multiplicity of uses of the stone, its market-
ability in different sizes, the availability of labor and the favorable 
tax situation .... "8 He was not allowed to evaluate the quarry prop-
erty by estimating the yearly profit resulting from a calculation of 
how many cubic feet of stone a year could be produced over a 40-year 
period. However, the director of the quarry was permitted to make 
the same evaluation which was excluded from Alexander's testimony. 
Yet when the director sought to give a more comprehensive presenta-
tion of this "method of computation," it was excluded "as a matter 
of law," "as being too speculative."9 The Supreme Judicial Court sus-
tained these exclusions. Since the petitioner's objections to the ex-
clusions at trial were general, the Court "assumed that the [lower 
court's] ruling was based upon the right ground."10 The Court held 
that the method of evaluation was too speculative, that the entire line 
of evidence on future profits could have been excluded in the discre-
tion of the judge since "the offered evidence did not relate to the 
value of the land as such"ll and that the land taken was wild land on 
which there was no "project definitely in the process of achievement 
at the time of the taking."12 The result which the Court reached was 
supported by two additional facts: most of the land taken was in 
Chelmsford which had a zoning ordinance that prohibited quarrying; 
and, just a few weeks before the taking the petitioner paid only $1400 
5 1965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1519, 212 N.E.2d 854. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 214 N.E.2d 721. 
7Id. at 318, 214 N.E.2d at 722. 
8Id. at 319, 214 N.E.2d at 723. 
9Id. at 321, 214 N.E.2d at 724. 
10Id. at 323, 214 N.E.2d at 725. 
11 Id. at 324, 214 N.E.2d at 725. 
12Id. at 325, 214 N.E.2d at 726. 
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for 18 acres of land, half of which was included within the 17.4 acres 
taken by the Commonwealth. However, the reasoning of the Court 
may be open to question. 
First of all, although it is true that much of what was excluded from 
Alexander's testimony came in during the director's testimony, the 
petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to have the fact finder hear 
one of his primary expert witnesses give his own calculations. The 
director was allowed to give a total future profit estimation but was 
forbidden to testify to the additional factors of the current market 
price of a cubic foot of granite and the projection of that price over a 
period of 40 years. It is not clear 'Yhy the Court should use as one of 
the reasons for sustaining this exclusion the fact that the trial judge 
could have excluded evidence on projected profits from mineral 
deposits. It has been frequently held that in evaluating land, profits 
from minerals cannot be considered independently; such profits are 
relevant only insofar as they reflect the value of the land itself.13 How-
ever, in the present case the trial judge did allow the director to give 
a total figure representing anticipated profits. The Supreme Judicial 
Court said that it assumed that the trial court's rulings on admissibil-
ity were correct, therefore why not assume that the trial court admitted 
the total profit figure as an index to the value of the land itself and 
not as an independent item of damages. If we make this assumption 
then the fact that the trial court could have excluded the testimony 
of profits altogether should not affect the question of whether the 
witness should have been permitted to describe his "method of com-
putation." 
A similar issue was discussed in Bachelder Truck Sales, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth.14 A parcel of land was taken on which there were 
five oil storage tanks and associated pipes. The trial judge admitted 
testimony on the depreciated reproduction cost at the date of taking 
of the tanks and pipes. It was contended that such cost had a relation 
to the fair market value of the land. The Supreme Judicial Court held, 
apparently as a matter of law, that the motion to strike this testimony 
should have been granted since on the facts of the case, the reproduc-
tion cost "was not applicable to the land taken."15 This result was 
correct since it appeared that the equipment was in great part either 
not on the land taken or of little or no value. Although the Fletcher 
case was admittedly more complex, the handling of this issue in the 
Bachelder case is far less confusing than Fletcher where the Court silid 
that the trial court was using its discretion in excluding evidence 
which "did not relate to the value of the land as such" even though 
the trial court said that its exclusion was made "as a matter of law." 
Another basis on which the Fletcher case16 sustained the exclusion 
13 Manning v. City of Lowell, 173 Mass. 100, 103, 53 N.E. 160, 161 (1899); 4 
Nichols, Eminent Domain §13.22, at 413-414 (3d ed. 1962). 
141966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 214 N.E.2d 36. 
151966 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 260, 214 N.E.2d at 38. 
16 H. E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth, 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 214 N.E.2d 721. 
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was the fact that the petitioner did not make the topological study 
of the land taken until after the taking, at which time there was no 
project in the process of achievement on the land. It is questionable 
whether this reasoning was correct since it was quite reasonable to 
assume that the land taken would become a future quarrying project 
in view of the surrounding use of the land. l7 In the Bachelder case, 
the Court held that it was proper to appraise a parcel of land in view 
of its potential future use with another parcel of land as an oil storage 
plant even though neither parcel had ever been used together. The 
position of the Court in Bachelder on the issue of future use of the 
land as an element of value is preferable to the position of the Fletcher 
case which seemed to demand a partially completed project before it 
would consider future uses. To be sure, the ordinance in Chelmsford 
prohibiting quarrying would be an obstacle to the potential use of the 
land taken as a source of granite; yet there was testimony on the 
probability of overcoming this zoning hindrance.18 Also, the fact that 
the petitioner made his scientific study of the land taken after the 
taking should not go to the question of the inherent value of the land 
as a possible future quarrying site. The more relevant issue was 
whether the value of the land as a quarrying site was not essentially 
the value to the owner, not fair market value. 
An issue which constantly arises in cases wherein the measure of 
damages is in issue is whether subsequent or prior sales of comparable 
land were too remote in time to be an accurate reflection of the fair 
market value of the land taken. Zambarano v. Massachusetts Turn-
pike Authority19 held that a sale 15 months after the taking was not 
too remote. H. E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth20 admitted evidence 
of a sale some five years before the taking. Burchell v. Commonwealth21 
tried to lay this issue to rest by reaffirming the position of Roberts v. 
City of Boston,22 which held that the" 'mere lapse of time after the 
taking did not render the evidence of the sales incompetent: "23 The 
discretion of the trial judge is to be given great weight. 
A more troublesome question concerns the nature of the prior or 
subsequent sales. In H. E. Fletcher Co. v. Commonwealth24 the state 
took 17.4 acres of "wild" land. The Court sustained the admission of 
evidence of prior sales of land in the surrounding area. Although there 
may have been error in that one' prior sale listed did not state the size 
of the tract sold and another listing did not state the price per acre, 
the Court found no prejudicial error since there was an "abundance" 
of other evidence on prior sales of "wild" land. Nor was there error 
174 Nichols, Eminent Domain §13.22[2] at 422-423 (3d ed. 1962). 
181966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 319-320, 214 N.E.2d 721, 723; Petitioner's Amended 
Bill of Exceptions, Record, p. 36. 
191966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511, 512, 215 N.E.2d 652, 653. 
201966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 325, 214 N.E.2d 721, 726. 
211966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 517, 215, N.E.2d 649, 651. 
22149 Mass. 346, 354, 21 N.E. 668, 669 (1889). 
23 Ibid., cited at 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 515, 517, 215 N.E.2d 649, 651. 
241966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 317, 326, 214 N.E.2d 721, 727. 
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in the admission into evidence of a sale of property zoned for residen-
tial uses, in which zone no quarrying was permitted. The Court appar-
ently felt that such a sale could be of assistance in evaluating the land 
taken from petitioner, even though the evidence tended to indicate 
that the primary value of the latter land was its use as a future quarry. 
A federal case focusing on the issue of compensation, A. G. Davis Ice 
Co. v. United States,25 upheld the District Court's exclusion of evidence 
of profits to be made under a sublease existing on the property. The 
property was leased to one Fawcett who in turn subleased it to an oil 
company for storage of heating oil, which lease had been returning 
a very substantial profit. The court noted, however, that the lease was 
subject to cancellation before the end of the term. Although the oil 
storage use was a nonconforming one under the local zoning ordi-
nance, other locations were available for this use in the community. 
Therefore the rule of City of Revere v. Revere Construction CO.,26 that 
profits made at the given location are admissible on the issue of com-
pensation, was not applicable. The particular rule depends upon the 
character of the property taken as being peculiarly suitable for a 
certain business; the profits obtained are, therefore, totally indepen-
dent of the abilities or knowledge of the owner. In the present case 
the sublease profits depended upon the gallonage run through the 
tanks and there was no guarantee of or commitment to any amount. 
Thus the court upheld the lower court's discretion in rejecting evi-
dence of compensation based upon profits as speculative and collateral. 
Subsidiary issues were also discussed. One involving the adequacy of 
the representation of the lessee at the trial was quickly rejected, since 
the lessee was actually represented by counsel throughout the case. 
Condemnation by the government was also correctly made of the fee 
estate as a unit, and not of separate interests so as to permit Fawcett's 
lease to be considered separately from the reversion of the landowner. 
The court quoted the established rule that subsidiary interests in a 
fee cannot add to its value for compensation purposes.27 The applica-
tion of this rule in the present case, as in the vast majority of condem-
nations, produces full compensation with sufficient accuracy. In some 
cases, however, the rule is economically if not necessarily constitution-
ally false,28 but the present case does not come within these exemp-
tions. 
§15.27. Damages: Entitlement and time of taking. In Bachelder 
Truck Sales v. Commonwealth} the state took two parcels of land, one 
of which had not been registered at the time of taking. The state 
argued that damages for the taking of the two parcels should be con-
sidered separately since the failure to register one of the parcels meant 
25 362 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1966). 
26285 Mass. 243, 189 N.E. 73 (1934). See also 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.26. 
27 Eagle Lake Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1947). 
28 See Riley v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 
(D.C. Cir. 1957), in which the sums of mortgages owed by the landowner exceeded 
the fair market value of the property taken. 
§15.27. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 214 N.E.2d 36. 
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that under General Laws, Chapter 185, Section 57, it had not been 
effectively conveyed. The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed, holding 
that although only the act of registration operated as the conveyance, 
the petitioner was the equitable owner of the land by virtue of his 
contract for sale. Since "the highest and best us~' of the two parcels 
was their use together, it was proper to consider the value of both 
parcels under a common ownership in petitioner. 
In the case of Spadea v. Stewart2 the Court held that even though 
land which is the subject of a contract for sale is taken by eminent 
domain, the vendee's equitable interest in the land makes him a party 
in interest in the vendor's petition for damages for the taking.s How-
ever, as a condition to the vendee's participation in that damage 
action, the vendee must assure the full paJment of the purchase price 
to the vendor. 
In Bachelder Truck Sales v. Commonwealth4 the state argued that 
the court below had erroneously determined the time of taking. The 
statute, General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 12, provides that "damages 
... be fixed at the value ... before the taking." The state took the 
position that "before the taking" means before the entire public work 
was begun and that since the state had taken a parcel of land in the 
same area in 1959, just two years before the taking of the two parcels 
now in question, it could be inferred that all of the takings were 
part of the same public project. The Court in rejecting this conten-
tion, reached a completely contrary inference that "a further taking in 
1961 by the Commonwealth in the same general location as the 1959 
taking suggests a new plan."5 Hence damages for the taking of the 
petitioner's two parcels were not to be calculated as of the time of 
the earlier taking. 
In Alden v. Commonwealth6 the Commonwealth took about a 
fourth of the petitioner's 200 acres for purposes of Interstate Route 
495 and its interchange with Route 9. The major issue was whether 
there was competent evidence of the value of the land prior to the 
taking. The trial judge admitted into evidence the purchase price of 
land adjacent to the petitioner's land but excluded testimony that the 
"dominant factor" which led to this purchase was the land's proximity 
to the proposed highway project. The Supreme Judicial Court held 
the exclusion to be prejudicial error since such a reason for the pur-
chase was evidence that the project had enhanced the value of the land 
and in the absence of "careful instructions,"7 "evidence of sales that 
reflect an enhanced value resulting from the project should not be 
admitted as evidence of prior value."8 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 199, 214 N.E.2d 72. 
8 G.L., c. 79, §§27, 29. 
41966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 214 N.E.2d 36. 
Ii Id. at 260, 214 N.E.2d at 38. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 937, 217 N.E.2d 743. 
7Id. at 941, 217 N.E.2d at 746. 
8Id. at 939, 217 N.E.2d at 745. 
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§15.28. Damages: Computation of interest .. The case of Shelist v. 
Boston Redevelopment Authorityl involved the question of the time 
when the new 6 per cent interest rate in eminent domain cases became 
effective. The petitioner's land was taken on October 25, 1961, and a 
verdict was entered 9n June 9, 1965. At the time of the taking and of 
a pro tanto payment by respondent, the interest rate was 4 per cent.2 
In 1963 the rate was increased to 6 per cent but was not to apply to 
"takings" made before November 6, 1963.3 Minor changes in the inter-
est statute were made in 1964, but the 6 per cent rate was not changed.4 
These changes were stated in the act as not to apply to interest on 
"judgments" entered prior to January 1, 1965.5 The Court held that 
the 1964 act did not repeal by implication the provision of the 1963 
amendment that interest 01}> takings made before the effective date of 
the act continued at 4 per cent. It noted that this would change sub-
stantive rights retroactively. Retroactive change must be clearly spelled 
out in legislation and is not to be left to implication.6 
The 1964 amendment presented difficulties because it stated that 
the amendment would apply to "judgments" entered after January 1, 
1965. The petitioner therefore argued that the 6 per cent rate which 
the 1964 amendment provides would apply to a case in which the 
"taking" occurred before January 1, 1965, (the 1964 act's effective 
date), so long as the "judgment" was entered after such date. The 
Court, however, determined that the use of the word "judgments" in 
the 1964 act referred to interest on judgments from the date the judg-
ment became effective. No interest on damages is, under either act, 
awarded from the time of taking to the time of judgment, so the use 
of the word "judgments" could not mean that the statute would au-
thorize 6 per cent interest on takings made prior to the effective date 
of the 1964 act. 
There seems little question but that the Court reached the correct 
result in this case, to the extent that the foggy nature of the legislative 
language reveals the intent of the 1964 amendment and its effect on 
the 1963 legislation. The case reveals a rather typical failure to artic-
ulate legislative intent in a situation in which it was not the com-
plexity of the policy involved but sloppy draftsmanship that resulted 
in another case unnecessarily clogging the court calendar. 
§15.29. Damages: Incidental and consequential. In R. J. Widen 
Co. v. United Statesl the United States Court of Claims reaffirmed the 
position of both the federal and Massachusetts courts that the compu-
tation of damages for the taking of interests in real estate does not 
§15.28. 1 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 565, 215 N.E.2d 748. 
2 G.L., c. 79, §37, as last amended by Acts of 1960, c. 298, §l. 
a Acts of 1963, c. 793, §§1, 3. 
4 Acts of 1964, c. 548, §2. 
5 Id. §5. 
6 The Court cited, among other cases, Doliner v. Planning Board of Millis, 349 
Mass. 691, 212 N.E.2d 460 (1965), noted in §15.20 supra. 
§15.29. l357 F.2d 988 (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
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include lo.ss of personal property and loss of profits. The Federal 
Government under the Flood Control Act2 began a project in North 
Adams after receiving a statutorily required agreement from Massa-
chusetts to save the United States free from damages caused by the 
construction work. The contractor went on the land in March 1957 
but the formal taking by Massachusetts was made on July 2, 1957. 
The Massachusetts court awarded compensation, in pursuance of the 
state's agreement as of the date of formal taking. The award did not 
include payment for damage to the plaintiff's personal property or its 
loss of profits. The Court of Claims in the present action held that the 
plaintiff's attempt to be compensated for these items in the federal 
court must fail for the same reason the Massachusetts court would 
deny recovery for them: they are traditionally not part of a damage 
award for a taking unless specific enabling legislation makes them 
compensable. General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 10, was interpreted 
by the Court of Claims as follows: "[T]he section merely provides the 
procedure for recovering such damages when that right is given by 
some other provision of law. In this case there is no such provision."3 
This section of the opinion restates the general as well as Massachu-
setts law concerning consequential and incidental damages. The court 
noted the numerous recent cases that have dealt with this rather 
thorny subject, when the compensation granted on a taking is con-
stitutionally just even though one with interests in the land does not 
recover a portion of his actual business and personal property losses. 
The emphasis in just compensation concepts remains on the interfer-
ence with physical dominion over the property taken and compensa-
tion is not given for any other losses suffered.4 In the Massachusetts 
decision awarding the plaintiff damages for the taking, the parties 
stipulated that the dam and water rights of the plaintiff were intact 
on July 2, 1957, the date of the formal taking. This stipulation was 
contrary to actual fact since the Federal Government's contractor had 
destroyed the dam and water supply in March.5 Yet the stipulation 
controlled in the Massachusetts case and the plaintiff received no 
compensation for loss of the use of its land from March to July. The 
2 Pub. L. 738, 74th Cong., 49 Stat. 1570 (1936), as amended by Pub. L. 228, 77th 
Cong.,55 Stat. 638 (1941). 
3357 F.2d 988, 995 n.12 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (following Massachusetts decisions on 
point). 
4 The theories justifying this result are multitudinous and logically convincing, 
but modern conditions have at least created a political if not constitutional 
problem in areas such as urban renewal and highway development in urban areas. 
See Huber, Legal Rights of Persons Whose Businesses Are Displaced (1962). See 
also A. G. Davis Ice Co. v. United States, 362 F.2d 934 (1st Cir. 1966), noted in 
§15.26 supra on the related point of loss of profits as evidence of market value. 
5 Massachusetts refused responsibility for damage caused prior to the formal 
taking in July and the United States could not be joined in the state court action. 
In the state action, the first two days of trial largely involved the exclusion of 
testimony of damages occurring prior to the formal taking. It was at this point 
that the parties agreed to the stipulation that all the petitioner's rights were 
intact up to the point of taking. 357 F.2d 988, 991, nA (Ct. Cl. 1966). 
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plaintiff sought in the present proceeding the rental value of the land 
taken to the period from the actual March taking to the formal July 
taking. The court held that the stipulation was not intended to cover 
the use of the land prior to July 2, 1957. Therefore, in addition to the 
compensation which Massachusetts granted for a permanent taking 
of the fee, the plaintiff was also entitled to recover from the United 
States compensation for the temporary taking by the Federal Govern-
ment during the three months preceding the formal taking. 
Senior Judge Whitaker, in dissent, pointed out that the plaintiff was 
entitled to the full value of the land taken at the time of actual taking, 
neither more nor less. He found no proof that this full value differed 
from the value determined in the state court proceeding as of July 2, 
1957. He disagreed with the majority's view that the March taking 
was a temporary one, holding instead that the only taking was 
the permanent one that occurred as a matter of fact in March. Thus 
the plaintiff in his view had failed to establish any damages for which 
it had not been compensated in the state action. 
On balance, the dissent is more persuasive on the facts of the case, 
since the majority relied upon highly technical, not to say artificial, 
distinctions between actual and formal takings. On the other hand, if 
a taking agency delayed formal taking an unreasonable period, the 
requirement for rent payment damages for the time between an actual 
taking and the completion of procedural formalities may be necessary 
to protect an owner of land. Certainly this rule will ordinarily encour-
age a taking agency to speed up the period between the two dates so 
as to avoid the increased liability. 
§15.30. Relocation assistance. The well-known need for an ade-
quate relocation program was substantially met during the 1966 SUR-
VEY year.1 The Department of Commerce and Development was 
assigned the basic function of assuring adequate housing, particularly 
for persons displaced by public action.2 The Commissioner is directed 
to establish a Bureau of Relocation which will carry out functions pre-
scribed by the new Chapter 79A of the General Laws entitled "Re-
location Assistance." This new chapter will apply to any acquisition 
of properties made after February 28, 1966, which will involve the 
displacement of occupants of six or more dwelling units or six or more 
business units. For each such acquisition, the Bureau of Relocation 
shall qualify a "relocation agency" under standards set out in the 
chapter,3 which agency will have the obligation to prepare a relocation 
plan. This plan must be submitted to the Bureau at least one month 
§15.30. 1 Acts of 1965, c. 790, creating a new Chapter 79A, entitled "Relocation 
Assistance," in the General Laws. The Act also amended Chapter 23A of the 
General Laws. 
See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.30; 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.28; 1963 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Laws §13.13 for earlier comments on relocation problems within 
the Commonwealth. 
2 G.L., c. 23A, §2(aY2), as inserted by Acts of 1965, c. 790, §l. 
8 G.L., c. 79A, §2. 
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prior to the date of the acquisition of the properties involved. The 
plan must contain the following: (1) the number of individuals, fam-
ilies, and business concerns being displaced; (2) the date displacement 
will begin; (3) the need of those displaced for relocation assistance; 
(4) the availability of suitable quarters within the means of those 
displaced; (5) the relocation program; and (6) clear indication that 
the relocation agency has co-ordinated its plan with other acquisitions, 
planned or prepared, within the community in which the present ac-
quisitions are being made.4 
Relocation programs in which the Federal Government makes reim-
bursement in whole or in part and which federal agencies must ap-
prove, are submitted to the Bureau for informational purposes. If, 
however, the provisions of Chapter 79A require more extensive assis-
tance than the particular federal program prescribed, the taking 
agency must also furnish this added assistance under a Bureau-ap-
proved relocation plan.5 
The new chapter prescribes a system to reimburse occupants for 
moving costS.6 The procedure to be followed makes the system of 
payment as simple as possible for both the taking agency and the 
person or business entitled to moving costs. Not later than one day 
before he is required to move, the occupant receives the choice of 
either the minimum relocation payment of $25 or a certificate, re-
deemable by the movers for actual moving costs up to the authorized 
maximum amount.7 If he receives the minimum he also gets written 
notice of his rights to reimbursement for costs over the minimum, and 
the procedure to be followed in making his claim. A three-months 
statute of limitations terminates any right to additional moving costs. 
Appeal by a person aggrieved by the action of the relocation or taking 
agency in denying a moving-cost claim may be taken to the Bureau. 
The chapter also provides for continuing supervision of the reloca-
tion agency and its plan by the Bureau. In certain cases of disapproval 
or suspension of a plan, an "emergency project" designation will 
permit a particular project to proceed despite a lack of adequate 
relocation housing.s 
The Bureau may agree to waive as to a particular acquisition any 
provision of the chapter that would prevent otherwise obtainable 
federal reimbursement.9 A grandfather clause is inserted to provide 
4Id. §4. 
/;Id. §5. 
6 Id. §7. Moving costs are payable to all displaced, even if not covered by a 
relocation plan, i.e., even if five or less units are being acquired. 
7Id. §l sets $200 at the maximum for individuals and families and $3000 as the 
maximum for displaced businesses. 
8Id. §IO. A request for such designation is made by the taking agency and 
approval is given by the Bureau if it is satisfied that the public interest demands 
that the project proceed even absent adequate housing and also if all other aspects 
of the relocation plan meet Bureau standards. This provision provides a safety 
valve but care must be taken to assure it does not become a hole in the boiler! 
9Id. §12. 
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that any taking agency qualified by the Federal Government to per-
form relocation assistance under a program involving partial or com-
plete federal reimbursement, will be a qualified agency under Chapter 
79A until July 1, 1967.10 More significantly, the Bureau is authorized 
to issue regulations to carry out the provisions of the chapter. 
It is, of course, easy to establish that persons or businesses displaced 
by eminent domain often do not receive full reimbursement for their 
losses. In an era when most government acquisition involves land 
already developed, simple justice and political wisdom combine to 
demand that these displaced individuals and businesses attain more 
complete reimbursement than the constitutional concep.t of just com-
pensation requires.H Certain losses, such as those for lost profits or 
reduction in good will, will tend to be thought of by most legislators 
as well as courts as speculative and may never be reimbursed in any 
but unusual situations.12 But many costs such as those for redecora-
tion, machinery installation, finder's fees and many other costs, are 
readily ascertainable, represent established losses, and present no real 
problem of proof. 
Even more important than the payments for moving costs autho-
rized by Chapter 79A is the provision of relocation advisory assistance 
therein required. The economic losses are often considerably less 
crucial or paralyzing to those forced to leave an area than are the social 
and psychological problems that relocation highlights or creates. The 
physical help furnished by locating adequate business and dwelling 
units and by assisting those dislocated to move to such units is a vital 
step in relieving some of the social costs of relocation. I t is, however, 
only the first of several desirable steps to help those displaced. Today 
many of those being relocated are particularly vulnerable to the 
buffetings of society, and ideally, extensive social and psychological 
counseling in such problem areas as family living, delinquency, and 
adjustment to a neighborhood and an urban society generally, should 
be routinely given at this time of great strain upon them. Business 
movers, in addition, often need extensive business counseling service. 
The language of the statute, however, does not seem to cover more 
than the physical requirements of those displaced,13 Thus the next 
10 Acts of 1965, c. 790, §6. 
11 Massachusetts provides historically interesting evidence of a recognition of 
the inadequacy of just compensation in certain cases, with its detailed and 
generous provisions for reimbursement in the water reservoir takings. Acts of 1895, 
c. 488, §14; Acts of 1896, c. 450, §I; Acts of 1898, c. 551; Acts of 1926, c. 375; Acts of 
1927, c. 321. 
12 See note II supra, for a type of the unusual situation in which these factors, 
despite their possibly speculative nature, are likely to be made reimburseable. 
13 G.L., c. 79A, §I, which reads: "Relocation advisory assistance, advice relating 
to available housing resources or business premises, and such other advice and 
assistance as the bureau may require," might be interpreted broadly to cover 
social and psychological counseling. But id. §4 sets out relocation plan requirements 
that do not cover more than the physical needs of those displaced and §5 indicates 
that plans meeting the requirements of §4 must be approved. 
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step in an adequate relocation program should involve the require-
ment of adequate counseling to those being displaced so that the 
social and psychological costs of public projects involving relocation 
are as routinely obligations of government as are the economic costs. 
§15.31. Other relocation legislation. In addition to the provisions 
of the general state program of relocation assistance described above,l 
the legislature adapted other relocation legislation during the 1966 
SURVEY year. Acts of 1966, Chapter 646, amended Section 7J of General 
Laws, Chapter 81. The section governs the Department of Public 
Works' payment of moving expenses for which the federal government 
provides partial reimbursement. The amendment provides that per-
sons who voluntarily vacate property at Department request because 
of a proposed acquisition are eligible for moving costs to the same 
extent as are those who move at later stages of the acquisition process. 
This state statute was necessary if the Commonwealth was to take 
advantage of the recently amended moving-costs section of the federal 
highway act, which reimburses a portion of all such state-incurred 
costS.2 
Relocation expenses of business concerns often exceed the maximum 
compensation permitted under federal and state law. Act of 1966, 
Chapter 619, is designed to permit cities and towns to contribute 
funds to redevelopment or housing authorities to be used to make 
relocation payments for those expenses not reimbursable from these 
sources. General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26J, was modified by the 
addition of a new definition of "Relocation payments." Those pay-
ments are now defined in terms of reasonable moving expenses and 
actual direct loss of property (except for good will or profits) caused 
by rehabilitation and conservation as well as conventional redevelop-
ment projects. Cities and towns are authorized to make these expendi-
tures3 but are controlled in the amount of indebtedness they can incur 
for these purposes. The bill as originally submitted included provi-
sions that would have added the amounts of these relocation grants to 
the sums for which the Commonwealth is at present authorized to 
bear a share of the cost, but this feature of the bill was lost.4 
The amount of relocation housing available is very limited in many 
urban areas. Public housing constitutes a large stock of housing, prob-
ably the largest amount in many communities, meeting the strict 
standards required of this housing. It has not always been available to 
those displaced by public projects, however, since many housing 
§15.31. 1 See §15.30 supra. 
2 House No. 91, par. 7 (1966), Report of the Department of Public Works. 
3 The act amends G.L., c. 121, §26CC, which governs municipal expenditures for 
urban renewal projects. 
4 Senate No. 232, §§4-6 (1966). The Department of Commerce and Development 
had included a recommendation for partial state reimbursement in its report. 
House No. 13 (1966). 
The bill as enacted had a somewhat similar predecessor in Acts of 1965, c. 728, 
which authorized the city of Cambridge to contribute funds to the Cambridge 
Redevelopment Authority for relocation payments. 
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authorities impose local residence restrictions on those applying for 
public housing under their jurisdiction. Acts of 1965, Chapter 740, 
amended General Laws, Chapter 121, Section 26FF, to forbid an 
authority from requiring that applicants who have been displaced by 
public action be residents of the municipality in which the project 
causing their displacement is located. Six months residence in the 
Commonwealth may, however, be required of such displaced appli-
cants. 
Businesses displaced by public action often find relocation very 
difficult but the problem is compounded for those businesses who 
depend upon an alcoholic beverages license for survival. The diffi-
culties are compounded in Boston by the existence of a substantially 
greater number of outstanding licenses than are now the maximum 
allowable, because of the decrease in population and statutory changes. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 657, amended Acts of 1965, Chapter 804, to 
authorize a substantial payment for retirement of their licenses to 
those licensees whose premises were taken by public action and who 
have not relocated. 
§15.32. Taking of public land: Highway purposes. In Revere 
Housing Authority v. Commonwealth1 the Metropolitan District Com-
mission took land owned by the Authority for the purpose of construct-
ing and maintaining a public parking area. The Authority contended 
that it was entitled to payment under Acts of 1955, Chapter 693, as 
amended by Acts of 1957, Chapter 657. Under these acts, the taking 
authority is directed to pay to the public agency whose land is taken 
for highway improvements an amount upon which the two bodies 
mutually agree or, upon failure to agree, the amount determined by 
the real estate review board in the Department of Public Works. The 
Supreme Judicial Court first determined that the case, a declaratory 
judgment action against the Commonwealth, was properly before the 
courts. Although the Commonwealth cannot without its consent be 
sued or impleaded in its own courts,2 consent to a suit can be given 
not only explicitly but also implicitly when the purpose of particular 
legislation indicates that the General Court must have contemplated 
that the Commonwealth could be made a party to any action involving 
the statute.s The Court analyzed the present statute and found that, if 
actions similar to the present one were not allowed, the remedy given 
by the pertinent acts of the legislature would have been only illusory. 
The Court also decided that land taken for public parking was 
taken "for highway improvements" within the intendment of the basic' 
15.32. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1047, 218 N.E.2d 94. 
2 Demetropo!os v. Commonwealth, 342 Mass. 658, 175 N.E.2d 259 (1961); Execu-
tive Air Service, Inc. v. Division of Fisheries and Game, 342 Mass. 356, 173 N.E.2d 
614 (1961). 
8 Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 340 Mass. 197, 163 N.E.2d 662 (1960). 
One can note that the Franklin case does not involve such a truly implicit 
rather than explicit consent to be sued and the present case can be interpreted 
as indicating a willingness on the part of the Court to erode, where reasonably 
feasible, the sovereign immunity doctrine. 
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legislative acts. This determination, based upon closely analogous 
precedents,4 might be somewhat questionable if the parking area, for 
example, was being used not in connection with any highways of the 
taking agency but as part of a swimming reservation. But even in such 
a case, the likelihood of fairly extensive highway traffic to the reserva-
tion should sustain a finding that a parking lot was for a highway 
purpose. 
§15.33. Eminent domain study commission. Numerous eminent 
domain bills were filed during the 1966 legislative session, reflecting 
the ever increasing importance and extensive impingement of the 
governmental power upon the public. By Resolves of 1965, Chapter 
141, a special commission to study eminent domain within the Com-
monwealth was authorized and apparently has been set up. By Re-
solves of 1966, Chapter 27, the scope of the commission's inquiry was 
increased to include a study of the time when value is to be deter-
mined upon a taking.! Certainly the conventional determination that 
just compensation is fair market value at the time of taking will not 
stand close scrutiny in the many situations in which land values have 
changed extensively after announcement or even rumors of a public 
project in the area. 
The commission itself is certainly needed, as is reflected by the 
numerous bills filed that tinker with inequities, real or imagined, in 
the basic legislation. While it is unknown what work has been done 
by the commission, the use of the common format of an unpaid com-
mission, over half of whose members are legislators who have too much 
to do in carrying out their regular legislative functions, does not 
present much hope for a study in any depth. It is interesting, if also 
appalling, that the Commonwealth will spend millions each year on 
eminent domain takings but cannot apparently conceive of the ex-
penditure of perhaps fifty thousand dollars to finance a complete 
study of the process by which money flows through its hands in large 
amounts. The overly familiar political slogan which espouses the use 
of business practices in government seems oddly to mean that ex-
penditures that have no business equivalent are to be subjected to 
serious re-evaluation while expenditures, such as those under eminent 
domain to which some business management principles would seem 
to be directly and completely applicable, are seldom studied to 
determine if they are carried out with proper consideration of the 
interests of all persons who may be involved. Let us hope that our 
fears that this commission will do little are totally unfounded and that 
thus we will see proposals that reflect a complete re-evaluation of the 
entire eminent domain process. 
4 See, e.g., Tate v. City of Malden, 334 Mass. 507, 136 N.E.2d 188 (1956). 
§15.!I!I. 1 The bill that was referred to the commission was submitted on 
petition of the Massachusetts Association of Real Estate Boards. House No. 1226 
(1966). 
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§15.34. Legislation. Although a great amount of eminent domain 
legislation was proposed, relatively few new statutory measures were 
adopted. General Laws, Chapter 79, Section 8A, was revised so that 
the offer of settlement or payment pro tanto must be made prior to 
60 days after the recording of the order of taking.! This change, 
however, merely corrected this section to conform to the recent 
changes in Chapter 79, that required payment of land damages within 
60 days after taking.2 
The perennial problem of the management and sale of property 
held by the Department of Public Works and not being used for a 
public project was involved in two statutory enactments. Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 755, amended General Laws, Chapter 81, Section 7E, to 
permit the Department to employ a desirably wide range of manage-
ment and disposal techniques in handling excess property. Such land 
can be sold, transferred to another public body, or leased, and the 
statute gives desirable flexibility to the Department at least in the 
matter of sales. One may debate the necessity for gubernatorial con-
currence in a transfer of such land to another public body and partic-
ularly in the lease of such land. More possible abuses could be con-
ceived in the sale of excess land than in its lease or transfer. 
Acts of 1966, c. 427, gives the Department of Public Works the 
authority to manage property acquired under the accelerated highway 
program from the time it is acquired until it is used for highway 
purposes. The act should produce certain beneficent results: federal 
reimbursement for interest payments on land damages awards; tax 
revenue to the municipalities in which the property is located; and 
protection of tenants who would otherwise have to move immediately 
upon the recording of the order of taking.3 The legislation is, of 
course, a very sensible approach to a problem that should not exist 
under adequate eminent domain practice. It is inconceivable today 
to imagine what real advantage is to be gained by requiring land to 
lie unused from the time of taking until the time of actual use on a 
public project. 
The Department of Public Works has now joined those agencies 
who have been given the right to lease air rights over their properties, 
in this case, over state highways.4 
D. HOUSING AND RENEWAL 
§15.35. Urban renewal: Legislation. Of a large number of bills 
submitted in the urban renewal area, relatively few were adopted. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 138, revised certain definitions in General Laws, 
Chapter 121, Section 26J, so that the "division of urban and industrial 
§15.34. 1 Acts of 1966, c. 530. 
2 See 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.27; 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.27. 
3 See House No. 3079 (1966), the Governor's message submitting the legislation. 
4 G.L., c. 81, §7L, added by Acts of 1966, c. 677. 
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renewal" and "housing board" are now defined as the Department of 
Commerce and Development. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 692, also amended Section 26J to add a defi-
nition of "Community renewal project." Section 26CC was modified 
to authorize a municipality to incur indebtedness for community 
renewal projects as well as other renewal and housing projects previ-
ously covered. 
Two acts involved changes in those authorized to take advantage of 
Chapter 121A, the Urban Redevelopment Corporation Law. Acts of 
1966, Chapter 421, authorizes charitable corporations to enter into 
the necessary agreements under this law, and the agreement consti-
tutes a waiver by the charitable corporation of its real property tax 
exemption. A much more lengthy statute, Acts of 1965, Chapter 859, 
authorizes individuals, or a group thereof in other than corporate 
form, to undertake, acquire, or carryon urban redevelopment projects 
under Chapter 121A by adding a new Section 18C to the chapter and, 
for Boston, an amendment to Acts of 1960, Chapter 652, Section 13. 
These amendments hopefully will encourage more redevelopment 
projects that do not require public taking of property or any extensive 
direct expenditures of public funds. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 704, amended Sections 26K, 26YY and 26ZZ 
of Chapter 121 of the General Laws to authorize urban renewal for 
the purpose of preservation, restoration or relocation of historic build-
ings. In addition, notice of any public hearing involving urban re-
newal is to be given to the Massachusetts Historical Commission, and 
any historical district commission in the municipality in which the 
project is located. 
§15.36. Legislation rejected. Legislation to recodify the housing 
and redevelopment laws of the Commonwealth was submitted by the 
Governor on the basis of the recommendations of the Governor's 
Advisory Committee on Housing and Urban Renewal,1 Not surpris-
ingly to one acquainted with the history of somewhat similar proposals 
in the past, the proposed legislation had the usual rather uneventful 
trip to legislative oblivion. The reasons for the reluctance to revise 
this complicated body of law are many but this writer is beginning 
to wonder, after the many rebuffs of similar legislation, if the main 
reason is that the General Court, or some of its influential members, 
finds a certain charm in section numbers such as 26GGG. At least, a 
revision retaining the old, rather fantastic section numbers could have 
no worse chance of adoption than the proposals that have failed of 
adoption to this time. 
An important proposal to enlarge the exceptions to a 30-year limit 
on conditions and restrictions2 was rejected by the House of Repre-
sentatives.3 The proposed legislation would have prevented the 30-
§15.36. 1 House No. 3327 (1966). 
2 C.L., c. 184, §23. See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.4. 
3 Senate No. 321 (1966). 
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year limit from applying to takings and purchases for public purposes, 
in addition to the present exemption for gifts or devises for public, 
charitable or religious purposes. 
It seems fair to state that the 30-year limitation on conditions and 
restrictions serves the dual purpose of facilitating title search and 
preventing private control of property to extend for overly long 
periods. The latter problem is not involved in a public taking or 
purchase and a proper re-recording system could avoid any problem 
with the first. 
In many situations involving urban renewal, conservation or other 
such programs dealing with projects thought of as involving controls 
over long periods of time, the public agency with an interest it wishes 
to enforce beyond the 30-year period may not comply with the statute's 
definition of those who can re-record or otherwise enforce conditions 
or restrictions. The legislature should give some consideration to these 
issues. 
The joinder of renewal and planning functions in Boston, which is 
at least theoretically undesirable,4 was retained, by reference to the 
next annual session of the bills seeking to abolish the joinder.1I 
§15.37. Low-income housing. The final report of the Special Com-
mission on Low-Income Housing,l noted in last year's ANNUAL SUR-
VEY,2 proposed a number of extensive legislative modifications of 
present law. Some of the proposed legislation was adopted during the 
1966 SURVEY year. A number of the same bills were submitted by the 
Governor to the General Court by special message, which also pro-
posed certain additional bills.8 
§15.38. Housing Finance Agency. Acts of 1966, Chapter 708, es-
tablished the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency. The original 
bill had been determined in an Opinion of the Justices1 to include 
expenditures which would not be for a public purpose, since the 
proposal included aid to projects which might have as many as 75 
per cent of its tenants persons who were not of low income or otherwise 
in need of any type of housing subsidy. The bill as finally adopted 
lays substantially more stress on furnishing housing for persons of 
low income and less for persons of somewhat higher income but con-
tinues to stress the original objective of avoiding the segregation of 
persons of low income into separate housing. The original provision 
for state backing of the agency's bonds was removed, thus avoiding 
the problem of state expenditures for a private purpose. The modifi-
cations of the statute as adopted should meet the objections raised in 
the Opinion of the Justices, particularly since the opinion itself cer-
4 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.5. 
5 House Nos. 291. 1368 (1966). 
§15.37. 1 House No. 4040 (1965). 
2 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.33. 
8 House No. 3326 (1966). 
§15.38. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1197. 219 N.E.2d 18. 
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tainly represents one of the narrowest readings of the public purpose 
doctrine in recent years. 
The bill provides a means by which low interest loans will be made 
available for building or rehabilitating housing designed for a com-
bination of low and moderate rentals. Rentals are defined in three 
separate categories: (1) market value rental; (2) below-market rate 
rental (market value rental less adjustment for the low interest mort-
gage from the Agency); (3) adjusted rental (the below-market rate 
rental less at least 10 per cent to reduce the rentals so that low income 
families can afford the housing at no more than 25 per cent of their 
income). At least 25 per cent of all units must be rented at the adjusted 
rental and the balance at no less than the below-market rate rental. 
Mortgage rates are set at no more than one quarter of 1 per cent more 
than the cost of the money to the Agency. Distributed profits of the 
mortgagor are limited to 6 per cent of the value of the mortgagor's 
equity, any undisturbed profits being used for adjustments of rents 
in the project. 
§15.39. Rental assistance. Acts of 1966, Chapter 707, created a 
new rental assistance program for the Commonwealth. l The system 
as adopted permits local housing authorities to lease dwelling units 
that meet quality standards and in turn sublease them at reduced 
rentals to families of low income. These families will pay rent at a 
rate approximately 20 per cent of income, so that as income rises 
the amount of the subsidy will be reduced or eliminated. A family 
in a position to bear the entire rent can obtain an assignment of the 
housing authority'S rights under the lease. Thus, a tenant will be able 
to remain in this type of housing even if he is no longer qualified for 
public housing. 
§15.40. Service of process on owner or agent. One of the most 
obvious problems in enforcing housing and occupancy codes has been 
the difficulty or impossibility of locating the owner of the property 
involved. Acts of 1966, Chapter 707, in addition to creating the rental 
assistance program discussed above, also enacted provisions requiring 
the nonresident owner of tenementsl to appoint an agent for service 
of process, the agent to reside in the community in which the property 
is located. Failure to file the name of such person will be deemed 
an appointment of the city or town clerk as agent. Upon the posting of 
a tenement for code violation, the owner is required to register his 
true name with the clerk.2 
§15.41. Low-rent housing expansion. The need for additional low-
rent housing was recognized by Acts of 1966, Chapter 705, which 
redefined "low-rent housing project" to include the purchase or acqui-
§15.!l9. 1 G.L., c. 121, §§26KKK-26MMM. 
§15.40. 1 As defined in G.L., c. 144, §2. 
2 These provisions were adopted as amendments to G.L., c. 144, §§1, 94 and 95. 
and c. 145, §§1, 59, and 60, and added new §§95A through 95C to c. 144 and §§60A 
through 60C to c. 145. 
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sItlOn of completed dwelling units that have been constructed Cor 
recently remodeled. This will permit local housing authorities to 
scatter public housing throughout a good portion of the community 
and, equally important, act much more quickly to develop any neces-
sary public housing than would be possible if a large project had to be 
planned and constructed from the beginning.1 The scheme adopted by 
this act is not limited to the purchase of detached dwelling units but 
applies also to purchase of some but not necessarily all dwelling 
units within a condominium, a large development, or a multi-family 
development. This will tend to foster the scattering of low-income 
families throughout a community and is thus a further application of 
the same policy found in the rental assistance program discussed above. 
§15.42. Housing for the elderly. Acts of 1966, Chapter 626, 
amended Section 26VV of Chapter 121 of the General Laws to increase 
the Commonwealth's guarantee and its annual contributions to the 
housing of elderly persons. The elderly are one of the largest com-
ponents of those eligible for low-income housing. Projects and pro-
grams that consider their special needs, without isolating them from 
the community, can be, under this new legislation, developed con-
siderably more effectively than was formerly possible. 
§15.43. Enforcement of state sanitary code. The provisions of the 
state sanitary code, setting forth minimum standards of fitness for 
human habitation, have always presented certain enforcement diffi-
culties. Some of these were remedied with the adoption of Acts of 1965, 
Chapter 898, under which rent withholding and receivership were 
authorized under certain conditions.1 To qualify for the extraordinary 
remedies involved, the state sanitary code and any additional local 
health regulations must be found to have been violated in one or 
more matters; the conditions involved must materially impair or 
endanger the health or well-being of any tenant therein; and the con-
dition must not have been substantially caused by the tenant or any 
one acting under his control. The local board of health investigation 
must support the allegations. The district court can then order the 
tenant to pay his rent to the clerk of the court as it becomes due if 
the tenant is either not in arrears in his rent or is willing to pay any 
arrearage into court. The clerk may be directed by the court to use 
all or part of the rents for removing the unsafe or unhealthy condi-
tions. 
A petition based on similar allegations can alternatively be brought 
by a tenant in the Superior Court and, upon proper proof, the court 
can appoint a receiver if it wishes, order rent paid to the clerk, or give 
other appropriate relief. 
§15.41. 1 The numerous changes are made by amendments to G.L., c. 121. 
§§26J, 260, 26AA, 26FF, and 26NN. 
§15.43. 1 The act amends G.L., c. 111, §§5, 124, and adding. new §§127A 
through 127J to the chapter. See an earlier discussion of the statute in its form 
prior to adoption in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.34. 
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Acts of 1965, Chapter 888, added a new Section 8A to Gene:nd L~ws, 
Chapter 239, to permit the violation of stan.dards of fitne~s for hum~n 
habitation to be a defense in an action of summary process to recover 
possession of the premises. The standards can be those imposed by 
the state sanitary code or local supplementary regulations, and viola-
tion must affect the health or safety of the occupants. The tenant must 
also, when not in arrears on his rent, give the person to whom he 
customarily pays the rent notice that he is withholding rent because 
of the violation, which the local board of health has determined exists 
and may endanger or impair health and safety. He further must show 
that he or anyone under his control did not cause the violation and 
that the condition can be remedied without vacating the premises. 
Further defenses to an action of summary process when a violation 
of the standards for human habitation have been violated were given 
in Acts of 1965, Chapter 898, Section 4. Under this statute, the action 
of summary process for non-payment of rent is denied not only 
while rent is being paid into court but also for nine months subse-
quent to the revocation or termination of the order. 
§15.44. Miscellaneous low-income housing matters. Tenant selec-
tion in public housing was the subject of two legislative acts. General 
Laws, Chapter 121, Sections 26NN and 26UU, were amended by Acts 
of 1965, Chapter 899, to require that the division of housing in the 
Department of Commerce and Development promulgate regulations 
governing the order of priority of selection of tenants, these regula-
tions to be binding upon local housing authorities. Section 26NN 
was further amended by Acts of 1966, Chapter 28, to make certain that 
totally handicapped or blind persons of low income would have a 
priority in obtaining public housing, without regard to their family 
status. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 78, amended Section 127B of General Laws, 
Chapter Ill, and created a lien in favor of a city or town for expenses 
incurred in cleaning dwellings that have been found to violate public 
health laws and regulations. 
Two resolves setting up special commissions also will deal with 
problems that tend to affect the availability and conditions of low-
income housing in the private sector. Resolves of 1965, Chapter 137, 
authorizes a study of the problems of obtaining fire insurance, partic-
ularly in certain areas of the larger urban centers in the state. Resolves 
of 1966, Chapter 24, authorizes a study of the minimum standards for 
human habitation set out in the state sanitary code and the effects 
of these standards on property owners. The emphasis in the language 
of the latter resolve unfortunately suggests an orientation toward the 
owner as opposed to the tenant. But certainly the problems of prop-
erty own,ers cannot be minimized and, in fact, various low-income 
housing programs adopted this year and noted above will tend to give 
landowners help in meeting standards that might otherwise prove 
economically burdensome if not impossible for them. But, clearly, the 
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reduction of the standards to a level below what should be minimal 
is not a solution for this vexing problem. 
E. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
§15.45. Industrial development. In the competition for industry 
with other states, the Commonwealth and its communities have often 
been at a disadvantage. They could not match the lures offered by 
others, often in the form of tax exemptions or even outright contribu-
tions through rent-free occupancy of publicly built plants, as well as 
somewhat more restrained but still attractive gimmicks. In last year's 
election, Amendment Article LXXXVIII of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution was approved by the voters, which states in part: "The indus-
trial development of cities and towns is a public function .... " This 
amendment presumably will permit the Commonwealth to meet fire 
with fire, if it so wishes, as it removes doubts as to the public purpose 
of this type of expenditure. 
One might well be happier with somewhat less vague language. 
What is - or is not - included as "the industrial development of 
cities and towns?" It is not difficult to imagine arguments favoring the 
building of homes for the executives and workers of a given business 
enterprise and this might well be, in a broad sense, for the industrial 
development of the community. 
One may also ask if industrial development excludes commercial 
development of the type not thought of generally as industrial. If so, 
presumably help to encourage an insurance company to settle in a 
locality would not be included. Nor would the phrase, it appears, 
include help to many of the establishments that might be very useful 
in developing tourism within a community, unless tourism is called, 
as it sometimes is, an industry rather than commerce. 
The General Court, in the late special session, enacted Acts of 
1966, Chapter 730, which prohibits municipalities from taking action 
under the amendment until enabling legislation is adopted. Such 
restraint is wise; when action is taken, the General Court will need 
all of the common sense and wisdom it can bring to bear on this 
subject. Certainly a clarifying amendment to the new amendment 
might well be considered. 
§15.46. Regional planning. No legislation of major importance to 
regional planning was adopted during the 1966 SURVEY year. Federal 
grant-in-aid programs are, however, tending more and more to stress 
regional considerations and are doing this not only by the develop-
ment of regional programs in areas such as air and water pollution 
control, but also by consideration of requirements that local commu-
nities engage in regional planning as a price for certification for 
various programs. We can thus expect a major emphasis on this area 
within the next several years. 
In the meantime, during the 1966 SURVEY year, Acts of 1966, Chap-
ter 588, amended General Laws, Chapter 6, Section Ill, to include 
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additional communities within the Metropolitan Area Planning 
District. The count of communities within the district is now 82, 
which is more than one fourth of the state's cities and towns. Acts of 
1965, Chapter 737, amended Section 113 of General Laws, Chapter 6, 
to give the executive committee of the Metropolitan Area Planning 
Council somewhat greater control over the financial affairs of the 
council. 
§15,47. Water and air pollution and waste disposal. Senator 
Clark of Pennsylvania has recently stated that any politician cannot 
fail to win strong voter approval if he gets on the anti-pollution 
bandwagon. Perhaps the conventional politicians' creed of "God, 
Mother and Country" will include the addition of "Clean Air and 
Water." The problem is, however, much too serious, not to say desper-
ate in some areas, to be the subject of light-hearted jest. Many things 
must be done and done soon if we are to preserve our national health 
and if the fantastic costs pollution is imposing upon the country are 
to be reduced to sensible levels. 
The legislature has in recent years been giving considerable atten-
tion to these problems. During the 1966 SURVEY year, Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 685, established a water pollution control division in the 
Department of Natural Resources;! the legislation is denominated the 
Massachusetts Clean Waters Act. The purposes of the act are too 
detailed to be discussed here but it should give the state a good start 
on an adequate water pollution program. 
The legislature at the same time, in Acts of 1966, Chapter 687, 
authorized the new division to expend up to $150 million on aid to 
municipalities in developing facilities to insure cleaner waters, includ-
ing sewage and industrial waste disposal plants. The division will 
also operate so as to take advantage of the federal programs in this 
area.2 
Industrial wastes are probably the major source of water pollution 
but the costs of adequate abatement or preventive equipment are very 
high. Recognizing the desirability of the carrot as well as the stick 
approach, the General Court gave water pollution abatement facil-
ities an exemption from local property taxes under certain conditions,S 
and also provided for an elective deduction or exemption under the 
corporate excise for the construction or improvement of industrial 
waste disposal facilities.4 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 748, substituted new Sections 44A through 
44K in General Laws, Chapter 40, which is the enabling act for 
regional refuse disposal districts. The changes in the act were numer-
ous but the same general concept of a voluntary district was retained. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 202, made alterations in the procedure used by 
§15,47. ! New §§26 through 50 were added to G.L., c. 21. 
2 See House No. 3426 (1966), a message of the Governor to the General Court 
on the issues of water pollution, for a brief outline of the federal programs. 
3 Acts of 1966, c. 700, adding new clause forty-fourth to §5 of G.L., c. 59. 
4 Acts of 1966, c. 701, adding §38D to G.L., c. 63. 
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cities and towns in contracting for the disposal of refuse by compost-
ing, sanitary land fill or other sanitary manners approved by the 
Department of Public Health.1i 
The problem of refuse and waste disposal is generating some litiga-
tion, which is probably merely a forecast of things to come. Duane v. 
City of Quincy6 held that a dispute between the city and inh.abitants 
living near the location of an incinerator, authorized by act of the 
General Court, was not an actual controversy ripe for decision in a 
declaratory judgment action. 
In Commissioner of Public Health v. Board of Health of Tewks-
bury7 the Department of Public Health, after hearing, had ordered 
the town to operate its dump by the sanitary land fill method or 
terminate its use. General Laws, Chapter Ill, Section 150A, gives the 
Department power to modify the assignment of any place as a dump-
ing ground on the basis of its constituting a public nuisance and a 
danger to public health. The Court found this provision authorized 
the order of the Department in this case and that it could be enforced 
under the provision in Section 150A giving a person aggrieved the 
right to bring an action to enforce a Department order. 
Board of Health of Holbrook v. Nelson 8 involved the same Section 
150A of General Laws, Chapter 111. The local board sought to enjoin 
the defendants from using certain land as a dumping ground. The 
Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the board that debris, mainly 
timber, from demolition of buildings is "rubbish or other refuse" 
under the statute and that, therefore, the dumping could be termi-
nated for failure to obtain the board's permission. 
§15.48. Conservation, open space, and recreation. The need for 
the preservation of land from the encroachments of complete urbaniza-
tion, so that it will be available for recreation, conservation, and open 
space uses, has generated, locally as well as nationally, considerable 
legislation and many proposals for solutions. Acts of 1965, Chapter 
768, provides a system for the protection of the coastal wetlands of 
the Commonwealth.1 The Commissioner of Natural Resources can, 
after giving notice and holding a public hearing, make and modify 
orders relating to use of coastal wetlands. Orders are recorded and 
copies are sent to owners of record. The legislation also provides for 
an action for compensation by those claiming the orders amount to 
a taking of their land by restricting all practical use thereof. 
Resolves of 1965, Chapter 110, created a special commission to 
study the taxation of forest, farm, or open space land, particularly a 
proposal to defer taxes on such land until the use is changed. Resolves 
of 1966, Chapter 4, requested the Judicial Council to study the prob-
5 The act amended G.L., c. 40, §4. 
6350 Mass. 59, 213 N.E.2d 250 (1966). 
71966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 535, 215 N.E.2d 745. 
81966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 863. 217 N.E.2d 777. 
§15.48. 1 The act adds new §105 to G.L., c. 130, and amends §8C of G.L., c. 40. 
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lems involved in the public acquisition of conservation easements 
over land in private ownership .. A bill to encourage landowners to 
make their land and water areas available for public use by limiting 
their liability2 was referred to the Legislative Research Council for 
study. 
A very interesting and somewhat questionable decision, Gould v. 
Greylock Reservation Commission,3 became quickly historical with 
the adoption of Acts of 1966, Chapter 694, abolishing the Mount 
Graylock Tramway Authority. In this case the Authority was held to 
have exceeded its powers in taking too much land in the park for its 
resort purposes. Its contract with a resort management company was 
also held to be beyond its powers. Perhaps as a result of this litigation 
the Greylock Reservation Commission was also abolished by Acts of 
1966, Chapter 444, and its powers transferred to the Department of 
Natural Resources. 
Acts of 1966, Chapter 648, authorized expenditures of $5 million by 
the Department of Natural Resources for outdoor recreation areas, 
and $1 million by the Department of Public Works for ocean beach 
recreational facilities. Acts of 1966, Chapter 470, directs the Depart-
ment of Public Works to provide for the protection of water resources, 
fish and wildlife, and recreational values in all advance planning for 
highway purposes. A special commission set up by Resolves of 1966, 
Chapter 35, is to make an investigation of recreation areas within the 
metropolitan district. . 
§15.49. Historic preservation. The Legislative Research Council 
published during the 1966 SURVEY year its report on an historic preser-
vation program for cities and towns.1 The proposal examined would 
authorize state aid up to 75 per cent of project costs to local historical 
commissions which acquired historically significant buildings, some-
what similar to procedures established in California and Pennsylvania. 
No bill involving this proposal was enacted, however, during the 
1966 SURVEY year. 
Acts of 1965, Chapter 707, changed the procedure for certifying 
historic landmarks by the Massachusetts Historical Commission.2 
Consent to the designation is to be given by the owner of such prop-
erty if privately owned, by the Governor for state-owned property, and 
by specified local officials if owned by a municipality. 
Several acts concerning local historic districts were enacted. Acts of 
1966, Chapter 579, increased the size of the existing Lexington historic 
district and established an additional historic district. By Acts of 1966, 
Chapter 211, an historic district commission was established in the 
town of Petersham. 
In Acts of 1966, Chapter 625, the Back Bay Residential District was 
2 House Nos. 2337, 3320 (1966). 
3350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
§15.49. 1 Senate No. 691 (1966). 
2 Amending G.L., c. 9, §27. 
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created and a Back. Bay Architectural Commission was set up in the 
Boston Redevelopment Authority. The commission is not to be sub-
ject to the supervision and control of the Authority, which acts as the 
planning board for the city, although communications of the com-
mission to the mayor, and its annual report, will be submitted through 
the Authority. The commission will have extensive power to preserve 
the exterior architectural features of the Back Bay area which has 
traditionally been considered one of the few architecturally great 
residential areas in the United States. 
§15.50. Transportation. Legislation relative to transportation pol-
icy was relatively minor this year. Acts of 1966, Chapter 595, autho-
rized the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority to conduct studies relative 
to the construction of a north-south toll turnpike through Worcester 
county. The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority was forbid-
den by Acts of 1966, Chapter 628, from disposing of its power plants 
and substations by sale or lease and was directed to continue to op-
erate them. At least those legislators in the MBT A area who vote for 
legislation such as this cannot complain of the size of the MBT A 
deficit. Presumably, disposal of these plants would only be contem-
plated if it would reduce the system's costs or otherwise was considered 
to interfere with its most efficient operation. 
One case decided during the 1966 SURVEY year, Eastern Massachu-
setts Street Railway Co. v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity,l involved the Authority'S power to contract to furnish mass 
transportation services to communities that were also served by the 
petitioner railway company. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the 
Superior Court's determination that the contracts involved were 
within the scope of the powers given to the Authority by the General 
Court. 
§15.50. l350 Mass. 340, 214 N.E.2d 889 (1966). 
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